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MAJOR LEAGUE PROBLEMS: BASEBALL'S 
BROKEN SYSTEM OF CUBAN DEFECTION 
MATTHEW J. FRANKEL * 
Abstract: Since the 1991 defection of Cuban pitching star Rene Arocha, 
dozens of Cuban baseball players have defected in order to play pro-
fessionally in the United States. The system of Cuban defection poses 
considerable humanitarian risks for defecting players and their families, 
including physical danger, family dissolution. and an entangling web of 
immigration and repatriation laws. Despite these dangers, Cuban ball-
players-boxed in by a complex combination of historical, political. and 
legal forces outside of their control-have no choice but to defect if they 
wish to play professionally in America. This Note argues that the pre-
vailing system of Cuban defection clearly \iolates important humanitarian 
concerns and should be abandoned. It concludes, however, that defection 
by Cuban baseball players will lil(ely continue until the fall of the Castro 
regime and end of the U.S. embargo of Cuba. 
INTRODUCTION 
The defections began on July 10,1991, when Cuban pitching star 
Rene Arocha simply had to "find an exit sign" at Miami International 
Airport. l Arocha made his daring, if unspectacular, escape during a 
layover after having played for the Cuban national team in an exhibi-
tion tournament in Tennessee.2 That day, Cuba's third-best pitcher 
cast off more than just his teammates; he left behind his family, his 
homeland, and over 125 years of Cuban baseball history.3 Arocha had 
* Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL (2004-2005). I'd like to 
offer my sincere thanks to the Journal staff for their invaluable editorial support; to the 
Boston Red Sox for an unforgettable 2004 season; to Red Sox Director of Player Develop-
ment Ben Cherington for taking the time out of a busy spring training schedule to speak 
to me; and to Kate and the rest of my family for their unconditional love, patience, and 
support. I dedicate this paper to my father, Arthur Frankel, a lifelong baseball player and 
fan who not only prodded me toward this topic, but offered great advice along the way. 
1 Sharon Robb, Cuban Pitcher Defects to Chase Major-League Dream, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 
1991, § 4, at 4; Steve Wulf, Sports People: Rene Arocha, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 19, 1993, at 
60. 
2 Sec Wulf, supra note I, at 60. 
3 Sec Robb, supra note 1. 
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become the first Cuban to defect from his country to play baseball in 
America.4 
By defecting, Arocha single-handedly ended Castro's monopoly 
on Cuban baseball talent and catalyzed a revolution on both sides of 
the Straits of Florida.5 In Cuba, young players, disgruntled by eco-
nomic malaise and lured by the promise of American professional 
baseball, began to view defection as a viable option.6 The Cuban gov-
ernment, humiliated over Arocha's defection, denounced the pitcher 
for committing "high treason against the revolution."7 But the Cuban 
populace, especially aspiring baseball players, followed his career in 
the United States.s After Arocha signed a contract with the St. Louis 
Cardinals of Major League Baseball (MLB)-and neither he nor his 
family were threatened with retribution-a wave of defection among 
Cuban ballplayers began that continues to this day.9 
In America, the Arocha defection and those that followed forced 
MLB to develop, on the fly, a series of imperfect policies to govern the 
recruitment and signing of Cuban players}O The defections also com-
plicated the U.S. government's policies regarding enforcement of the 
Cuban embargo, domestic immigration law, and repatriation trea-
ties. ll MLB's ad hoc approach and the longstanding policies of the 
United States have fostered a broken system that encourages Cuban 
players to abandon their families, risk life and limb, place themselves 
at the mercy of self-interested agents, and circumvent or even break 
immigration laws to play in America}2 
4 Kevin Baxter & Fernando Dominguez, Baseball Si, Cuba No, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 21, 
1994, at 12. 
5 See id. 
6 See id.; Barry Horn, Cubans Travel Long Road to Join Rangers, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 
11,1993, at 7. 
7 See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 4. 
8 See MILTON H.JAMAIL, FULL COUNT: INSIDE CUBAN BASEBALL 77 (2000). 
9 See id. at 76-101. Cuban sports journalist Gilberto Dihigo noted that after Arocha's 
defection, "[el mpieza el cosquilleo de )0 puedo M [then the 'I can do it too' attitude beganl. Id. 
at 77. Dihigo maintained that most defecting players were driven by a desire to compete at 
the highest level, rather than a desire to make a political statement. Id. 
10 See Scott M. Cwiertny, Note, The Need for a Worldwide Draft: Major League Baseball and 
Its Relationship with the Cuban Embargo and United States Foreiffll Policy, 20 Loy. L.A ENT. L. 
REV. 391, 411-16 (2000); Matthew N. Greller, Note, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fast-
ball Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League Base-
ball and United States-Cuba Relations, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1647, 1661--84 (1999); Andrea 
Kupfer Schneider, BaseballDiplomacy, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 473, 479--86 (2001). 
1\ See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 391-411,417-21. 
12 See Kevin Baxter, Throwing Cuban Players a Lifeline: Agent Joe Cubas Has Turned Paupers 
in Princes-But Not Without Raising a Sea of Distm-bing Questions, SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 10, 
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There can be no doubt that the policies of the Castro regime are 
primarily responsible for the current dilemma.13 But there can also be 
no doubt that MLB rules and American foreign policy exacerbate an 
extremely complicated problem.14 
Perhaps the complexity of the issue is the reason that out of doz-
ens of scholarly articles dealing with MLB's relationship with Latin 
American countries, only four effectively tackle the intersection of 
1998, at 16; James C. McKinley Jr., Cuban Players Defect, But Often With a Cost, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 1999, § I, at 1. 
13 See JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 7 (noting that the "two main problems facing Cuban 
baseball are, ironically, Cuba's abundance of players with little possibility of advancement 
and the unwillingness of the Cuban government to provide the necessary economic stimu-
lus for players to remain in the country"). Cuba's current economic crisis began in the 
early 1990s when the collapse of the Soviet Union portended the end of large amounts of 
economic aid from the communist superpower. See. e.g., STEVE FAINARU & RAy SANCHEZ, 
THE DUKE OF HAVANA: BASEBALL, CUBA, AND THE SEARCH FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM 42-
44 (2001); MARIFELI PEREZ-STABLE, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: ORIGINS, COURSE, AND LEG-
ACY 174-201 (1999). Castro's regime, though adept at sports development, has failed to 
ameliorate the dire economic conditions or find another significant source of foreign aid. 
See, e.g., What Follows Fidel', ECONOMIsT,Jan. 2, 1999, at 31 ("The [Cuban] economy is in a 
mess. Corruption is rife. Prostitution is rampant .... [Clrime is rising. The country's infra-
structure is crumbling."); Steve Wulf, Running on Empty, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 29, 
1991, at 60,60,64 ("Cubans lack for certain things-foodstuffs, fuel, foreign friends-but 
pride is not one of them .... The fact that the government has chosen sports as its vehicle 
for survival is not surprising, given Cuba's rich athletic tradition."). The Cuban govern-
men t legalized the circulation of U.S. dollars in 1993 to halt the economic free fall, which 
allowed those who could obtain dollars to spend them on valuable commodities such as 
food and medicine. JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 5-7. Yet, according to author Milton Jamail, 
the situation for most baseball players deteriorated further: 
The bottom line is that since Cuba legalized dollars in 1993, the position of 
baseball players in Cuban society has gone from privileged to underprivi-
leged. Cuban players receive only a small salary, less than the equivalent of 
$30 a month, but it takes at least $120 a month to sustain a basic level of com-
fort in Havana. Cuban musicians and artists are allowed to come and go-and 
to bring dollars back into the country. University professors and medical doc-
tors can become waiters in tourist hotels, hawk wares to tourists on the street, 
or bake cookies to sell to neighbors-and earn dollars. Baseball players are 
effectively excluded from this sector of the economy, and if they receive 
money from the United St.'ues, they become suspect for fear they are plan-
ning to defect. They must remain poor and above suspicion. 
Id. Lastly, the Castro regime's policy of banning from baseball those suspected of wanting 
to defect actually increases players' motivation to do so. See id. at 90. Since "a pitcher not 
able to pitch is like a sugar cane cutter without a machete," banned players will almost 
always attempt to leave Cuba. See id.; see also Sue Anne Pressley, Five More Baseball Players 
Leave Cuba, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1998, at A3. 
14 SeeCwiertny, supra note 10, at 391-93; Greller, supra note 10, at 1689-95. 
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MLB, American foreign policy, and Cuba. I5 The first of these articles, 
by Jason Weiss, is a wide-ranging survey of baseball's intersection with 
various legal issues pertaining to Cuban players. I6 The second, by Mat-
thew Greller, focuses primarily on "baseball diplomacy"-that is, 
changing the current framework of rules and laws governing Cuban 
ballplayers so as to improve diplomatic relations between the United 
States and CubaP The third article, by Scott Cwiertny, argues that 
MLB must change its rules governing Cubans in order to avoid giving 
teams an incentive to violate American foreign policy and MLB regu-
lations. I8 And the fourth, by Professor Andrea Kupfer Schneider, dis-
cusses the political and legal ramifications of the March 1999 series 
between the Baltimore Orioles and the Cuban national team, and dis-
sects a legal dispute involving the free agent status of a Cuban defec-
tor.19 
While all four articles deal with important questions and argue 
persuasively, none specifically or substantially address the visceral is-
sue of defection. 20 Several discuss the possibility of MLB adopting a 
worldwide draft, which would alter the system for Cuban players,21 
and others discuss the proposed Baseball Diplomacy Act, House Bill 
189, which would eliminate defection as a prerequisite for Cuban 
ballplayers to play in America.22 Only Greller calls decisively for a se-
ries of changes that, if enacted, would eliminate defection altogether, 
but limits his discussion to the context of better baseball diplomacy.23 
This Note, by contrast, frames the need to jettison the current 
defection system in humanitarian terms.24 It argues that the current 
defection system ignores the basic safety and welfare of young Cuban 
15 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 391; Greller, supra note 10, at 1648-49; Schneider, su-
pra note 10, at 473; Jason S. Weiss, The Changing Face of Baseball: In an Age of Globalization, Is 
Baseball Still as A.mencan as Apple Pie and Chevrolet?, 8 U. MIAMI INT'L & CaMP. L. REV. 123, 
136-39 (1999-2000). 
16 See generally Weiss, supra note 15. 
17 See generally Greller, supra note 10. 
18 See generally Cwiertny, supra note 10. 
19 See generally Schneider, supra note 10. 
20 See generally Cwiertny, supra note 10; Greller, supra note 10; Schneider, supra note 
10;Weiss, supra note 15. 
21 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 425-27; cl Greller, supra note 10, at 1702-05 (suggest-
ing the incorporation of Cuban players into the domestic amateur draft, which would have 
a virtually identical effect on Cuban players as would implementing a worldwide draft). 
22 Baseball Diplomacy Act, H.R. 189, 108th Congo (2003); see Greller, supra note 10, at 
1708-10 (encouraging passage of Baseball Diplomacy Act); Schneider, supra note 10, at 
485 (mentioning Baseball Diplomacy Act). 
23 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1708-10. 
24 See infra Section II. 
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ballplayers and their families. 25 Part I surveys the basic historical, po-
litical, and legal framework in which the current system operates, the 
evolution of that system, and how it functions today. Part II explains 
why the current system is irreparably flawed from both a humanitar-
ian and immigration law standpoint. Part III examines the viability of 
possible alternatives to the current system, including the desirability 
and probable impact of both a worldwide draft and the Baseball Di-
plomacy Act. This Note concludes that until the Castro government 
falls and the Cuban embargo is lifted, there is little chance that the 
defection system will be materially altered or eliminated. 
I. THE CURRENT DEFECTION SYSTEM 
The current system of Cuban baseball defection is a direct result 
of the tumultuous relationship between Cuba and the United States 
in the post-Cuban Revolution era. This section traces the historical, 
political, and legal context of the defection system. Furthermore, this 
section analyzes the evolution of Cuban baseball defection and how it 
functions today. 
A. The Historical, Political, and Legal Framework 
1. The United States, Cuba, and Baseball: History and Politics 
Despite the rancorous relationship between Cuba and the United 
States today, baseball served as a common tie between the two coun-
tries for nearly a century before the Cuban Revolution of 1959.26 
Baseball was first played during the 1840s in the shadow of New York 
City, but it did not take long to reach Cuba.27 Over the next several 
decades, burgeoning sea commerce brought baseball to port cities 
throughout North America and the Caribbean.28 In Cuba, the game 
was primarily popularized by American sailors, both military and mer-
chant, and Cubans returning from American universities.29 Key port 
25 See infra Section n. 
26 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1685. 
27 See ROBERTO GONZALES ECHEVARRiA, THE PRIDE OF HAVANA: A HISTORY OF CUBAN 
BASEBALL 90 (1999) (crediting Nemesio Guilla with bringing the first bat and ball to Cuba 
in 1864 after attending Springhill College in Mobile, Alabama); BENJAMIN G. RADER, 
BASEBALL: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S GAME 3 (1992) (recounting baseball's beginnings in 
Hoboken, New Jersey circa 1845). 
28 See ECHEVARRiA, supra note 27, at 82. 
29 See id. at 83, 90; Louis A. Perez, Jr., Between Baseball and Bullfighting: The Quest for Na-
tionality ill Cuba, 1868-1898,81]. AM. HIST. 493, 499-500 (1994) (describing how ·Cubans 
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Clues in Cuba's sugar trade, Havana and Matanzas, became hotbeds 
for the new sport.30 In December 1874, clubs from the two cities 
squared off in what is thought to be the first recorded Cuban ball-
game, with Havana winning 51-9.31 
Much like its American counterpart, Cuban baseball has always 
been tightly intertwined with history, politics, and social change.32 In 
the latter third of the nineteenth century, native Cubans, or alollos, 
used baseball to express discontent with the colonial Spanish author-
ity and distinguish themselves as "a people apart and a nation distinct 
from Spain. "33 Through baseball, Cubans rejected the rigid class 
structures and pervasive racism of the colonial power.34 The sport be-
came "a form of opposition to the ideas of Spain: to play baseball was 
to be alollo, to be mollo was to be Cuban. "35 Thus, since its inception, 
baseball has been considered "part of the nacionalidad cubana [Cuban 
national identity]. "36 
In addition, baseball became a cultural bridge between Cuba and 
the United States, with ballplayers constantly in transit from one 
country to the other.37 From the 1870s and continuing until the Cu-
ban Revolution, Cuban stars were free to leave their country to par-
ticipate at all levels of American professional baseball.38 Between 1947 
and the early 1960s, Cuba was the primary source of Latin-American 
returned to the island .... with a knowledge of baseball-not simply as a popular sport 
learned abroad but as a paradigm of progress"). 
30 See ECHEVARRIA, supra note 27, at 82-83. 
31 See id. at 86 (noting that "[n]o big issue was made of the lopsided score"). 
32 See id. at 3-9; Perez, supra note 29, at 494 ("[B]aseball has long sen'ed to give ex-
pression to Cuban nationality, both as a means to nationhood and as a metaphor for na-
tion."). In America, the 1919 "Black Sox" scandal and Jackie Robinson's 1947 debut as the 
first Mrican-American m;yor leaguer, for example, both symbolized salient political and 
social issues extending far beyond the sport itself. See RADER, supra note 27, at 99 (noting 
that public response to the Black Sox scandal "offered conclusive evidence that baseball 
had achieved a prominent and special place in American life"); id. at 142 (asserting that 
Robinson's entrance into the league "not only heralded the reversal of organized base-
ball's long-term ban against black players but signified the beginning ofa new era of white-
black relations in the United States"). 
33 Perez, supra note 29, at 509. 
34 See id. at 505-09. 
!l5 JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 15 (quoting Gilberto Dihigo, Cuban-born son of Martin Di-
higo, widely considered the best Cuban ballplayer ever and the only Cuban in the National 
Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, New York). 
36 Id. (quoting Dihigo). 
37 See id. at 20-23. 
36 See id. at 20. The first Latin-American player to play professionally in America was 
Cuban Esteban Bellfm, who played for a team from Troy, New York, in 1871. Id. By 1946, 
thirty-nine Cubans had played in MLB. Id. 
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talent for the majors, producing such stars as Orestes "Minnie" Mi-
noso, Tony Oliva, and Tony Perez.39 Concurrently, MLB organizations 
sent players to Cuba to participate in the professional Cuban 
League.40 Because the league operated during the winter, m,yor 
leaguers were able to hone their skills during the off-season, and 
Cuba's top players gained an opportunity to compete against Amer-
ica's best.41 Some MLB teams also chose Cuban sites for their spring 
training camps, further exposing Cuba's enthusiastic fans to Amer-
ica's all-stars.42 
But the symbiotic relationship between American and Cuban 
baseball came to an unfortunate halt with the Cuban Revolution of 
1959.43 Guerilla leader Fidel Castro seized power after the collapse of 
the authoritarian Batista regime, which was weighed down by corrup-
tion, ineptitude, and popular opposition.44 Castro quickly imple-
mented wide-ranging socialist policies, most notably agrarian reform, 
ostensibly geared toward empowering the dases populares.45 But the 
United States, which opposed Castro's nationalization of key indus-
tries and the appropriation of American property in Cuba, sought to 
replace the new regime with one friendlier to American interests.46 
For the Cuban government-moving rapidly toward communism and 
faced with increasing hostility from the United States-aligning with 
the Soviet Union, America's Cold War rival, was a natural next step.47 
In this tumultuous Cold War context-typified by the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco and the near-disastrous Cuban Missile Crisis-baseball relations 
between Cuba and the United States effectively ended.48 Two major 
developments were, and continue to be, responsible for this breach: 
Castro's ban on professional sports and the United States' embargo of 
39 [d. 
40 See JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 22. 
41 See id. 
42 Sec id. at 18-22. The New \ork Giants trained in Havana in 1937, and the Brooklyn 
Dodgers trained there in 1941, 1942, and 1947. [d. at 18. The 1947 trip was designed to 
provide Jackie Robinson a more relaxed and receptive atmosphere than he would have 
found in Florida. [d. 
43 Sec id. at 16-28. 
44 See PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 13, at 52--60; see also ECHEVARRiA, supra note 27, at 
302-304 (describing Batista as "a fairly ludicrous small-time populist dictator" who was not 
as corrupt as Trujillo in the Dominican Republic or the Somoza family in Nicaragua) . 
45 See PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 13, at 61-81. 
46 See id. at 79-80. 
47 See id. at 80-81. 
48 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 8-10,20-28. 
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Cuba.49 In 1961, as part ofa wide-ranging sports reform program em-
phasizing socialist values, Castro abolished professional baseball in 
Cuba.50 Declaring el tdunfo de la pelota libre sobre La peLota esclava-the 
triumph of free baseball over slave baseball-Castro began to develop 
the most successful amateur baseball system in the world.51 This 
highly developed system is now the symbolic centerpiece of the revo-
lution, and Castro, master of propaganda, portrays the sport and its 
players as embodying the socialist idea1.52 
At roughly the same time, the United States instituted the Cuban 
embargo, driving another devastating wedge between Cuban and 
American basebal1.53 In the years 1960-61, the Eisenhower admini-
stration imposed a partial embargo, prohibited American exports to 
Cuba, and severed diplomatic relations.54 The embargo's chief pur-
poses were to isolate the Castro regime economically so as to acceler-
ate its demise and further American security interests by undermining 
Castro's relationship with the Soviet Union.55 The Kennedy admini-
stration and subsequent administrations expanded and strengthened 
the embargo, prohibiting virtually all commerce and travel between 
the nations.56 MLB teams necessarily ceased all activities in Cuba, and 
by the end of the 1980s the number of Cuban players in the league 
had dwindled to a handfu1.57 Of course, since Rene Arocha's trendset-
ting 1991 defection, the Cuban presence in MLB has grown.58 Yet, de-
spite its failure to topple Castro and the end of the Cold War, the em-
49 See id. at 129-30. 
50 See ECHEVARRIA, supra note 27, at 355;JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 29. 
51 See J.'l.MA IL, supra note 8, at 29. Ironically, for all but the most ardent proponents of 
coercive state power, "free baseball" would certainly entail allowing a player to contract 
freely with any team willing to pay his price, whereas "slave baseball" might more accu-
rately describe a system in which meagerly compensated players are compelled to play for 
their government. See id. at 141 ("Fidel is still stuck on la pclota esclava-only now the slaves 
are the players trapped on the island."); cf ECHEVARRiA, supra note 27, at 361-68 (discuss-
ing the advantages and disadvantages of the Cuban amateur system). 
52 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 133-34. 
53 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996,22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-
6091 (2003); see.JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 129 (calling the embargo "the fundamental bar-
rier impeding improved baseball relations between Cuba and the United States"). 
54 See PETER SCHWAB, CUBA: CONFRONTING THE U.S. EMBARGO 15 (1999). 
55 See Digna B. French, Economic Sanctions Imposed Uy the United States Against Cuba: The 
Thirty-Nine YeaT Embargo Culminating with the Cuban LibC1'ty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBER-
TAD) ,'let of 1996,7 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMPo L. REV. I, 1 (1998-99). 
56 See id. at 2-3. 
57 See PETER C. BJARKMAN, BASEBAn WITH A LATIN BEAT 365-73,394 (1994);.JAMAIL, 
supra note 8, at 129. 
58 See ECHEVARRiA, supra note 27, at 388-91 (listing players who defected after Arocha 
and played in MLB). 
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bargo is as strong and wide-ranging as ever, continuing to undermine 
baseball relations between Cuba and the United States.59 
Perhaps the most dexterous and durable dictator on the planet, 
Castro has also used Cuban amateur baseball and the existence of the 
embargo to further his political ends.60 The Castro regime fashions 
national heroes out of its star ballplayers; they symbolize the "success" 
of the revolution and are critical to government propaganda.61 Addi-
tionally, the embargo provides Castro with a convenien t excuse for his 
failed economic policies.62 By using the embargo to stir up national-
ism and anti-American fervor, Castro "distracts the Cuban people 
from their real problem: [his] authoritarian system. "63 
For Americans, perhaps the most visible effect of Castro's 
authoritarian, economically failing system is the constant wave of Cu-
ban immigrants seeking a better life in the United States.64 During 
and immediately following the revolution of 1959, many Cubans fled 
to South Florida in response to the appropriation of their property 
and the threat of persecution under the new regime.65 Since then, 
thousands of Cubans have come to the United States each year.66 Be-
cause illegal immigration from Cuba to the United States is pervasive, 
the federal government has implemented strict immigration controls 
governing Cuban immigrants.67 Federal law imposes serious criminal 
penalties for immigrant smuggling, a widespread practice, and trea-
59 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 129. 
60 See id. at 150 ("Fidel, Cuba's owner-manager, understands how to use baseball to 
achieve his political goals. "); SCHWAB, supra note 54, at x-xii (noting that the "politically 
astute and talented" Castro has "for 40 years ... stood against the United States in its very 
own backyard"). 
61 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 93,130,141,148-50. 
62 See Lucien]. Dhooge, Fiddling with Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and Demo-
cratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARIZ . .J. INT'L & COMPo L. 575, 624-25 (1997). 
63Id. (qllotingH.R.REP.No.104-202,at25 (1995». 
64 See Matthew A. Pingeton, Comment, United States hnmigration Policy: Detaining Cuban 
Refugees Takenji'Om the Sea, 8]. TRANSN.U'L L. & POL'y 329, 329-31 (1999). 
65 SeeJAMES S. OLSON &.JUDITH E. OLSON, CUBAN AMERICANS: FROM TRAUMA TO TRI-
UMPH 53 (1995). 
66 Id. at 93; see Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Immigration Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-
Transition Cuba, 16 BERKELEY]. IN'r'L L. 234, 240-51 (1998). 
67 Sec, e.g., Travieso-Diaz, supra note 66, at 238-51; Donald L. Brown, Comment, 
Crooked Straits: Jl.lmitime Smuggling of Humans jimn Cuba to the United States, 33 U. MIAMI IN-
TER-AM. L. REv. 275-91 (2002); Pingeton, supra note 64, at 329-41; Read Sawczyn, Note, 
The United States Immigration Policy Toward Cuba l'iolates Established Maritime Policy, It Docs Not 
CUTtail Illegal Immigration, and Thus Should Be Changed So That Cuban Immigrants An? Treated 
Similarly to Other Immigrants, 13 FLA.]. IN1·'L L. 346-52 (2001). 
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ties with Cuba limit the ability of Cubans to enter the United States 
legally and illegally.68 
Most Cubans who come to America settle in and around Miami, 
eagerly awaiting-and oftentimes working toward-the downfall of 
the Castro regime.69 Miami's stridently anti-Castro Cuban-American 
population is a powerful political voice, especially given Florida's 
reputation as an important swing state in presidential elections.70 The 
result is an American foreign policy toward Cuba that is largely be-
holden to the Cuban-American population in Florida, making reform 
con trover sial and extremely difficult to enact.71 
While Cuban Americans may loathe Fidel Castro, they love base-
ball defectors like Rene Arocha, who buck his repressive system to 
play baseball in America.72 But for most defectors, politics is, at best, 
secondary.73 Deciding to defect is always anguishing, and doing so is 
often physically dangerous.74 Cuban baseball players who want to play 
in America are caught in a system-one rooted in historical, political, 
and legal forces far outside of their control-that offers no good 
choices. 
2. U.S. Foreign Policy and Regional Treaty Law Mfecting Cuban 
Players and MLB 
The most salient aspect of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba is the 
forty-five year old embargo, which tightly regulates virtually all com-
68 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324; Cuba-U.S.: Joint Statement on Normalization of Migration, 
Building on the Agreement of September 9,1994, May 2,1995,35 I.L.M. 327 [hereinafter 
Joint Statement]; Travieso-Diaz, supra note 66, at 244-49; Brown, supra note 67, at 282-86. 
69 See OLSON & OLSON, supra note 65, at 92, 95-96 (noting that as of 1995, 60% of Cu-
ban Americans lived in Florida, that 650,000 lived in Dade County, which includes Miami, 
and that "most Cuban Americans [are] opposed to the Castro regime but disagree[] over 
... how best to see that democracy is achieved in Cuba"). 
70 See id. at 96-97; see also, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100-03 (2000) (discussing the 
facts underlying the 2000 presidential election dispute in Florida); Ken Fireman, Presiden-
tial Campaign: Bush Returns to Florida Battleground, NEWSDAY, Mar. 21, 2004, at A32 (calling 
Florida "the ultimate swing state"). 
71 See WILLIAM RATLIFF & ROGER FONTAINE, HOOVER INSTITUTION, A STRATEGIC FLIP-
FLOP IN THE CARIBBEAN: LIFT THE EMBARGO ON CUBA 2-4 (2000). 
72 See George Diaz, Cuban Defector Testing the Majors, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 4, 1991, 
at Dl ("There is ... continued adulation from Miami's Hispanic community that em-
braced [Arocha] as a hero who embarrassed Castro."). 
73 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 77. 
74 See, e.g., Kevin Baxter, Three's Company: Where Else But Miami Would You Find a Trio of 
Cuban Defectors on the Same Team r, MIAMI HERALD, June 3, 2002, at 1 C; S.L. Price, What Price 
Freedom?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 30,1998, at 42,42. 
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merce between the United States and Cuba.75 From a U.S. policy per-
spective-in other words, putting aside Castro's failed policies-the 
embargo is the primary reason for the preservation of the broken sys-
tem of Cuban baseball defection.76 In its current, codified form, the 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1994-
commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act, in reference to its chief 
sponsors-the embargo is more intense and sweeping in scope than 
ever. 77 
The subject of withering academic criticism, the Helms-Burton 
Act seriously impacts MLB and Cuban defectors alike.78 The Act man-
dates strict enforcement of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 
(CACRs), which provide the basic governing rules of the embargo.79 
As they pertain to MLB clubs and Cuban players, the CACRs prohibit 
"transactions incident to travel to, from, and within Cuba" as well as 
any "payment or transfer" to any Cuban national.80 The broad terms 
of the embargo prohibit MLB organizations from conducting any 
business in Cuba, such as scouting or signing players.81 Cuban players 
who sign lucrative contracts in America are technically prohibited 
75 See French, supra note 55, at 1-4. 
76 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 129-30. 
77 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996,22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-
6091 (2003); see French, supra note 55, at 7-11. 
78 See JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 129; see also Dhooge, supra note 62, at 633 (arguing 
against the Helms-Burton Act because, among other reasons, it "jeopardizes the leadership 
role of the United States in various international institutions" and may "serve to prolong if 
not strengthen the very regime it is designed to topple"); French, supra note 55, at 24-25 
(arguing that the embargo is inappropriate from an ethical point of "iew and that the 
Helms-Burton Act likely violates international law); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and 
Cuba: The Helms-Burton itct, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 433-34 (1996) (arguing that the Act 
"hampers the discretion of the executive branch; it purports to micromanage a transition 
whose contours no one can predict; it places too much emphasis on property issues almost 
two generations old; it penerts our immigration and travel laws; and it seeks to impose 
American policy judgments on nationals of friendly foreign states in a manner that is both 
unlawful and unwise"). But see David M. Shamberger, Note, The Helms-Burton A.ct: A Legal 
and Effective Vehicle for Redressing U.S. Property Claims ill Cuba and Accelerating the Demise of the 
Castro Regime, 21 B.C. IN'f'L & COMPo L. REV. 497, 501 (1998) (arguing that the Act will 
"bring[) an end to Castro's human rights abuses, and expedit[e] the rise of democracy in 
Cuba"). 
79 See 22 U.S.C. § 6032(c). The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACRs), 31 C.F.R. 
§§ 515.101-.901 (2003), were implemented in 1963 by the Kennedy Administration pursu-
ant to authority granted by the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1) 
(2003). 
80 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.305, 515.309(a), 515.415(a)(1). An exception to this general rule 
allows Cuban emigrants and others to send $300 eYery three months to Cuban households. 
31 C.F.R. § 515.570(a). 
81 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 129. 
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from sending all but a small portion of their earnings back to Cuba.82 
Because the embargo prevents MLB team officials from traveling to 
Cuba and transacting with any Cuban national, players must not only 
leave Cuba, but also defect-that is, renounce Cuban citizenship-to 
play for an MLB dub.83 
Federal immigration policy also has serious implications for Cu-
ban ballplayers who choose to defect.84 For Cuban defectors who es-
tablish residency in a country other than the United States and sign 
professional contracts-the most common scenario-the immigration 
process is relatively simple.85 With the aid of their new team, these 
players are able to apply for and obtain visas pursuant to immigration 
laws regulating foreign athletes who want to play in America.86 
For players who defect by sea, however, U.S. immigration law is 
considerably more entangling.87 At the heart of the United States' 
Cuban immigration policy is the so-called "wet feet, dry feet" rule, by 
which the United States generally returns Cuban immigrants inter-
dicted at sea to Cuba, while allowing those who reach U.S. soil to re-
main.88 This rule is enforced pursuant to a 1995 bilateral agreement 
between the United States and Cuba, prompted by the Cuban refugee 
crisis of 1994.89 The treaty requires the United States to allow 20,000 
Cubans to immigrate legally each year, and to return to Cuba all ille-
gal Cuban immigrants interdicted at sea.90 Given the repressive nature 
of the Cuban government, however, the United States allows Cubans 
plucked from the sea to apply for asylum if they credibly fear persecu-
tion upon their return.91 
82 See 31 C.F.R. § 515.570;JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 129. Cubans in MLB routinely violate 
the rule limiting remitt,mce to $300 per three months. See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 
13, at 111-12, 138-39 (noting that Limn Hernandez, after revealing in a newspaper inter-
view that he sent money in excess of the limitations back to Cuba, was directed to cease 
and desist by the U.S. Treasury Department). Those convicted of violating the embargo 
restrictions can face up to $100,000 in fines and/or ten years in prison. 31 C.F.R. 
§ 515.701. 
83 Cf Greller, supra note 10, at 1661-66 (noting that a combination of U.S. immigra-
tion policies and MLB rules compel players to defect if they want to play in MLB). 
84 See id. at 1655-61. 
85 Seeid. at 1655-66. 
86 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (O)-(P) (2003); see also Greller, supra note 10, at 1655-66. 
87 SeeCwiertny, supra note 10, at 415-19. 
88 See Brown, supra note 67, at 276-78; Sawczyn, supra note 67, at 346-49. 
89 SeeJoint Statement, supra note 68, at 327; Travieso-Diaz, supra note 66, at 243-44. 
90 See Joint St,ltement, supra note 68, at 328, 330; Brown, supra note 67, at 276. 
91 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2004); Brown, su-
pra note 67, at 277. 
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Furthermore, because the "wet feet, dry feet" policy places a 
premium on reaching American soil, some illegal immigran ts resort 
to professional smugglers for transport from Cuba to Florida.92 Rec-
ognizing this problem, in the 1995 agreement both the United States 
and Cuba pledged to take "prompt and effective action to prevent the 
transport of persons to the United States illegally. "93 Congress has in-
stituted severe criminal penalties for engaging in or aiding an immi-
grant smuggling operation.94 Most Cuban ballplayers who defect by 
sea must confront and overcome these rigid U.S. immigration poli-
cies.95 
Lastly, agreements between Cuba and its neighbors, particularly 
the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica, present possi-
ble problems for Cuban defectors.96 All three countries have repatria-
tion treaties that generally require the return of Cuban refugees.97 If 
detained in any of these countries, a defector may face deportation to 
Cuba, where poverty and persecution usually await.98 
3. MLB Rules Governing Cuban Players 
Aside from the above legal constraints, MLB subjects Cuban play-
ers to a more complex set of rules than it does other foreign amateur 
players.99 Ballplayers residing within the United States, its territories 
92 See id. at 278-82. 
93 Joint Statement, supra note 68, at 329. 
94 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324. 
95 See infra notes 214-283 and accompanying text. 
96 SeeCwiertny, supra note 10, at 419-21. 
97 See id. 
98 See 4 Cuban Defectors ,1re Sent Home, N.V. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at C5. 
99 See Schneider, supra note lO, at 480-81; see also MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, THE 
OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RULES BOOK, R. 3, 4 (2003) [hereinafter MLB RULES 
BOOK]. The MLB Commissioner "has broad power to approve contracts; resolve di5putes 
between clubs and between clubs and players; discipline players, clubs, and club owners; 
and make rules governing the administration of the baseball enterprise." ROGER I. 
ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 96 (1998). Thus, the Commissioner's 
office formulates and enforces all rules gm'erning the entrance of players into the league, 
including Cubans and other foreigners. See Cwiertny, supra note lO, at 411-12. Federal 
judge Walter C. Lindley, in a 1931 case involving the Commissioner's power of investiga-
tion, famously described the Commissioner as "a benevolent but absolute despot [with] all 
the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater familias." l\filwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 
F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. III. 1931). Legal challenges to the Commissioner's actions rarely suc-
ceed, as courts generally do not disturb the Commissioner's decisions absent a clear viola-
tion of his duties under the MLB charter. See ABRAMS, supra, at 113. See generally Matthew B. 
Pachman, Note, Limits on the DiscretionalY Powers of Professional Sports Commissioners: ,1 His-
toIical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy, 76 v:<\. L. REV. 1409 
(1990). 
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and possessions, and Canada are subjected to the June amateur 
draft. loo Once an MLB team drafts a player, that franchise holds exclu-
sive negotiating rights to that player until just before the following 
year's draft.IOI Usually, the team will sign the drafted player to a con-
tract at the minor league level, where the player will have the oppor-
tunity to prove himself and, if he is good enough, to move up to the 
majors.102 
For players residing in a foreign country, however, the equation 
changes. I03 Foreign players are not drafted; their entrance into the 
league is governed instead by a simple minimum age requirement. I04 
As long as this requirement is met, foreign ballplayers are free agents 
who can sign with any team willing to pay.I05 Free agency tends to 
produce larger contracts for these players, a result of bidding wars 
between teams vying for their services.106 Therefore, agents advise for-
eign players to remain outside the United States until they are signed, 
as establishing U.S. residency would subject them to the amateur draft 
and generate less lucrative contracts.107 
In conjunction with the embargo, MLB policy further compli-
cates this scenario for Cuban players hoping to play professionally in 
100 MLB RULES BOOK, supra note 99, R. 4(a). 
101 Id. at R. 4(d)-(f); Greller, supra note 10, at 1662 n.59. A player who is eligible for the 
draft but is not drafted can negotiate with any team as a free agent. MLB RULES BOOK, 
supra note 99, R. 4(i); Schneider, supra note 10, at 480. 
102 See, e.g., Jerry Crasnick, Ordonez. Is Off to Succeed the Wiz.ard, DENVER POST, Apr. 7, 
1996, at C15 (discussing Cuban defector Rey Ordonez's path from Cuba, through the New 
York Mets minor league system, to his debut for the Mets on opening day, 1996); Horn, 
supra note 6 (discussing how two early Cuban defectors, Osmani Estrada and Alexis 
Cabreja, were drafted and signed to minor league contracts by the Texas Rangers). 
103 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1662. 
104 MLB RULES BOOK, supra note 99, at R. 3(a)(I)(B). The minimum age for a player 
to sign with a team is sixteen years, as long as the player turns seventeen "prior to either 
the end of the effective season for which the player has signed or September 1 of such 
effective season, whichever is later.· Id. 
105 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1662-63. 
106 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 413-14; David Beard, 'El Duque,' Friends Get Visas, 
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Jan. 7, 1998, at 12A. But see Diana L. Spagnuolo, 
Comment, Swinging for the Fence: A Call for Institutional Reform as Dominican Boys Risk Their 
Futures for a Chance in Major League Baseball, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 264 (2003) 
(arguing that current rules encourage teams to "exploit[] Dominican boys to serve as a 
source of cheap labor for MLB"); Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 414 (explaining how the 
Dodgers used the foreign player free agency rule to "impose low-paying contracts on [two 
players residing in the Dominican Republic] by not giving the players the opportunity to 
retain agen ts") . 
107 See Murray Chass, New Route to lHajorsfor Cuban Defectors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1995, at 
B24. 
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America,108 An April 1977 letter from the then-Commissioner Bowie 
Kuhn to all MLB clubs, the so-called Kuhn Directive, sets forth the 
cornerstone of MLB's Cuba policy.109 The directive forbids any club 
from recruiting or negotiating with any player in Cuba. l1O Cuban 
players must therefore establish residency outside of Cuba if they wish 
to play in MLB.lll Thus, MLB rules work with the political and legal 
considerations discussed above to effectively compel Cuban players to 
defect if they want to play American baseball.l12 
B. The Evolution of the Defection System 
l. Early Defections: Draft Variants 
Until December 1995, MLB dealt with the still relatively unusual 
dilemma of Cuban defection by subjecting the defecting player to the 
June amateur draft or some variant thereof, such as a special lot-
tery,l13 Thus, after Rene Arocha's unprecedented 1991 defection, 
MLB formulated an ad hoc policy for Cuban nationals who had estab-
lished residency in America.1l4 Rather than subject Arocha to the 
regular amateur draft, MLB held a special lottery open to any team 
interested in signing him.115 
MLB did not always follow this model, however, in dealing with 
the Cubans who followed Arocha's lead,l16 In 1992, Cuban national 
team shortstop Osmani Estrada and left fielder Alexis Cabreja de-
fected while in Mexico and later walked across the border in to the 
United States.117 Although both sought free agent status, MLB balked 
at the notion of allowing illegal immigrants to sign with the highest 
108 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1664. 
109 See id. at 1664-65. 
110 See id.; Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 4. A 1990 memo updated the Kuhn Direc-
tive, and forbade "the discussion or negotiation with anyone in Cuba regarding the signing 
of any player in Cuba." Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 4. 
111 Greller, supra note 10, at 1665. 
112 [d. at 1666. 
113 Seeid. at 1668-73. 
114 See Horn, supra note 6. After defecting in Miami, Arocha sought political asylum 
and established residency in the United States. Greller, supra note 10, at 1669-70. 
115 See Horn, supra note 6. Eight teams expressed interest in signing Arocha, consid-
ered the third- or fourth-best pitcher on the Cuban national team. See id; Wulf, supra note 
1, at 60. 
116 Greller, supra note 10, at 1671. 
117 See Horn, supra note 6. 
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bidder. lIS Instead, MLB subjected both players to the domestic ama-
teur draft.1I9 
During this period, MLB vacillated between these two approaches 
when dealing with other defectors.12o When Rey Ordonez, a future 
star shortstop for the New York Mets, defected in 1993, MLB sub-
jected him to a special lottery similar to Arocha's.l2l Pitcher Ariel 
Prieto's entry in the 1995 amateur draft following his defection in 
April 1994 was the last instance in which a high-profile Cuban player 
came directly to the United States and was subjected to a draft or draft 
varian t.122 By the fall of 1995, sports agent Joe Cubas, a self-described 
"enemy of the Castro Government," had begun to use a different ap-
proach for shuttling Cuban ballplayers from their homeland to the 
majors.123 
2. Current Defections: Joe Cubas' "New Route "124 
Cubas pioneered his technique while representing two highly-
touted prospects, pitchers Osvaldo Fernandez and Livan Hernandez, 
who had defected in Tennesee and Mexico, respectively, during the 
summer and fall of 1995.125 Cubas, the American-born son of Cuban 
immigrants, realized that by assuming the role of agent and aiding 
players' defections, he could simultaneously exploit the market for 
Cuban talent in MLB and embarass Castro.126 Instead of having his 
players seek residency in the United States as previous defectors had 
done, Cubas took the pair to the Dominican Republic for six months 
to establish residency.127 
118 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1672. 
119 See id. at 1672-73; Estrada and Cabreja were eventually drafted and signed by the 
Texas Rangers. See id. Similarly, pitchers Michael Tejera and Hanzel Izquierdo, both mem-
bers of the Cuban junior national team, defected in Miami in 1994 and were subjected to 
the 1995 domestic amateur draft.JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 82. 
120 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1668-73. 
121 See Baxter & Dominguez, supra note 4. 
122 See Chass, supra note 107; Bill Plunkett, Cuban Refugee lIJakes Pitch for Big Time, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, May 28,1995, at 12. 
123 Dave Anderson, El Duque's Man Stashes Two More, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at D5; 
Chass, supra note 107; see also JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 82-85. 
124 Chass, supra note 107. 
125 See Baxter, supra note 12. 
126 See Ira Berkow, Fulfilling Dreams of Freedom and Dollars: Joe Cubas Helps Cuban Ballplay-
ers Defect, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1996, at BIl. 
127 See id. 
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Cubas had discovered the foreign player "loophole" in MLB's 
rules.l28 By establishing residency for Fernandez and Hernandez in 
the Dominican Republic rather than the United States, Cubas avoided 
subjecting his players to the amateur draft or a draft variant.129 MLB 
ruled that the Cuban-born players' foreign residency allowed them to 
sign with any team as free agents.130 Thus, the players could secure 
more lucrative contracts than had they been drafted and required to 
negotiate exclusively with one team. 131 
Cubas' "new route" is now the model for Cuban baseball defec-
tors and their agents. 132 Whether the players defect in the United 
States or elsewhere, they invariably seek to establish residency in a 
Caribbean or Central American nation to obtain free agent status.133 
128 See Chass, supra note 107; see also Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 412-16; supra notes 98-
III and accompanying text discussing MLB rules. 
129 See Chass, supra note 107. 
130 See id. Note that the Kuhn Directive did not apply to the players because they had 
established legal residence outside of Cuba and renounced Cuban citizenship. See Greller, 
supra note 10, at 1664 n.69. 
131 See Chass, supra note 107. Naturally, the new route was a financial boon to Cubas as 
well, as he took at least five percent of both Fernandez's $3.2 million deal with the San 
Francisco Giants and Hernandez's $4.5 million deal with the Florida Marlins. See Berkow, 
supra note 126; Thomas Stinson, Baseball '96: National League: The Rookies: Cubans Will Make 
Contributions, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 31, 1996, at 23F. Although there is no maximum 
percentage an agent is permitted to take, the M.yor League Baseball Players' Association 
(MLBPA) guidelines for registered player agents sets the average at four to five percent. See 
FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 100; Berkow, supra note 126. Mter a bitter fallout 
between Hernandez and Cubas in July 1996, Hernandez claimed that Cubas had tried to 
charge him 25% of his earnings, an allegation that Cubas denied. See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, 
supra note 13, at 117. 
132 See Greller, supra note 10, 1678-79. Although Cubas was widely credited for pio-
neering this new method of defection, then-director of Latin-American scouting for the 
New York Yankees, Rudy Santin, claimed to have been developing the method for years. 
See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 68. Santin and Cubas, childhood friends, en-
tered into an unofficial agreement: Cubas would represent Cuban defectors, set up foreign 
residence for them, and then funnel the players through Santin to the Yankees organiza-
tion. See id. at 65-68. Thus, the players would land big contracts, Cubas would make hefty 
commissions, and Santin and the Y,'mkees would have a monopoly on Cuban talent. See id. 
Only the misguided intervention of infamous Yankees owner George Steinbrenner foiled 
the arrangement. See id. at 93. Mter the Y"nkees' stunning loss to the Seattle Mariners in 
the first round of the 1995 playoffs, Steinbrenner "launched a purge that was staggering 
even by his lofty standards," including the firing of scouting director Bill Livesey, Santin's 
boss. See id. Santin resigned, lamenting that his "whole plan went down the drain," but 
Cubas zealously continued to pursue Cubans interested in attempting this new method of 
defection. See id. at 93-94. 
133 See, e.g., Richard Justice, New Nation, Old Feelings: Cuban Defector Arrojo Reflects on Pre-
vious Career, WASH. POST, May 2,1999, at DlO (noting that Cuban defector Rolando Arrojo 
established residency in Costa Rica before signing with the Tampa Bay Devil Rays); Tyler 
Kepner, Miningfor Riches on the Farm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at Dl {noting thatJose Con-
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Yet, the formidable financial benefits that some players reap from this 
method of defection do not necessarily offset the negative aspects of 
the current system.134 For defectors and their families, the system is 
fraught with anguish, danger, corruption, and legallandmines.135 
II. HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES VIOLATED 
Although criticized on a number of grounds by other commenta-
tors, the defection system's negative effects on Cuban ballplayers and 
their families have received scant attention.136 Important humanitar-
ian principles, however, may provide the most compelling incentives 
to overhaul the current system. 137 Players who navigate the defection 
process are systematically denied protections afforded by interna-
tional human rights law, which finds its modern basis in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration).138 Moreover, the system 
undermines immigration agreements between Cuba and the United 
States which "seek to address safety and humanitarian concerns and 
to ensure that migration between the countries is safe, legal, and or-
derly."139 
Despite the Declaration's guarantee that "[e]veryone has the 
right to leave ... and to return to his country," Cuban baseball defec-
tors must relinquish this right if they wish to play baseball in Amer-
ica. 140 Furthermore, despite the Declaration's assertion that the "fam-
treras established residency in Nicaragua before signing with the New York Y.'lnkees); 
Buster Olney, One Man's Journey to the Cell tel' of Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1998, at Al (de-
scribing how Orlando "El Duque" Hernandez established residency in Costa Rica before 
signing with the New York Yankees). 
134 See Baxter, supra note 12; McKinley Jr., supra note 12. 
135 See Baxter, supra note 12; McKinley Jr., supra note 12. 
136 See generally Cwiertny, supra note 10; Greller, supra note 10; Schneider, supra note 10; 
Weiss, supra note 15. 
137 See infra notes 147-283 and accompanying text. 
138 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, arts. 13 § 2,16 § 3, U.N. 
GA Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/81O, 71 [hereinafter UDHR]; infra notes 147-213 and 
accompanying text. 
139 SeeJoint Statement, supra note 68, at 328-29; infra notes 214-283 and accompany-
ing text. 
140 UDHR, supra note 138, at art. 13 § 2; see infra notes 147-164 and accompanying 
text. This right is recognized internationally and commonly referred to as the right of 
return. See HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE 56-60 (1987). Commentators debate whether the right to return applies 
only to citizens of a country, or whether it applies to a broader set of individuals who are 
connected to a country by other relevant criteria such as race, religion, language, ancestry, 
birth, and prolonged domicile. See id. Cuban baseball defectors would likely be covered by 
the Declaration's protections under the broader standard. See id. at 58. If the nalTower 
2005] Baseball's Broken System of Cuban Defection 401 
ily is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the State," every Cuban defector must 
abandon his family indefinitely-and sometimes forever. 141 
Additionally, the significant minority of defectors who can only 
escape by sea risk serious injury or death, as well as the possibility of 
repatriation to Cuba.142 In encouraging such action, the defection sys-
tem runs counter to Cuba's and the United States' "common interest 
in preventing unsafe departures from Cuba which risk loss of human 
life. "143 Sea defectors, along with the families of all Cubans defectors, 
are also likely candidates for dangerous human smuggling operations 
from Cuba to the United States that can result in criminal sanc-
tions. l44 The current system's encouragement of players and their 
families to take part in smuggling operations also cuts against the two 
countries' "pledge[] ... to take prompt and effective action to pre-
vent the transport of persons to the United States illegally. "145 
A. Defection as Rejection of Pat ria 
For most Cuban baseball players, the decision to defect is ex-
tremely difficult because "defection implies a rejection of pallia," or 
homeland.146 By forcing players with Major League dreams to leave 
Cuba forever, the curren t system places tremendous strain on the 
young men who confron t the decision to defect.147 Cubans are unde-
niably fierce in both their nationalism and their love of baseball, yet 
standard applied, Cuban defectors would technically haye no right of return, since they 
voluntarily reject Cuban citizenship. See id. at 56-63. However, even if one accepts the nar-
rower definition, the defection system still ,·iolates the underlying policy: to eliminate arbi-
trary linlitations on freedom of movement, especially return to one's home country. See id. 
at 56-67. 
141 UDHR, supra note 138, at art. 16 § 3; see infra notes 165-213 and accompanying 
text; see also GERASSIMOS FOURLANOS, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INGRESS OF ALIENS 87-117 
(1986). This internationally recognized principle offamily unity, as it is commonly known, 
may not technically be an individual right; rather, as the principle is generally understood, 
individuals benefit from the State's duty to refrain from undertaking measures causing 
dispersion of families, and to facilitate reunification of already separated families. FOUR-
LANOS, supra, at 109-11. However, like the right of return discussed in note 140, supra, the 
defection system clearly violates the underlying policy of family unity. See id. 
142 See infra notes 214-283 and accompanying text. 
143 Joint Statement, supra note 68, at 328. 
144 See infra notes 246-283 and accompanying text. 
145 Joint Statement, supra note 68, at 329. 
146 JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 78. 
147 See id. at 73-78. 
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the system requires that these passions remain mutually exclusive.l48 
Even though a few Cuban players manage to secure multi-million dol-
lar contracts once they defect, every defector must leave his home-
land forever.149 By defecting, players relinquish their basic human 
right to return home, a right "fundamental [to] exercising one's per-
sonal autonomy. "150 
The Cuban government reinforces the implication that defecting 
players have rejected all things Cuban by laboring mightily to create a 
public fa(ade of intransigence, anger, and disgust.151 Mter the requi-
site denunciations of the defectors-who are labeled traidores al beisbol, 
or "baseball traitors"-the government acts as if the departed players 
no longer exist, never mentioning them again in the state-controlled 
press.152 In official record books, baseball defectors have asterisks by 
their name; the explanation reads, abandono el pais, or "left the coun-
try. "153 
The government's public denunciations of defectors, however, 
have only a limited effect on the Cuban public's perceptions of de-
parted players. lM Almost any Cuban citizen understands how depriva-
tion could drive a ballplayer to seek a better life in America, and few 
begrudge the defectors' decision to leave.155 Most Cubans reject using 
the verb "to defect" -desertm=-to describe departed ballplayers be-
cause of its negative military connotation.156 Many high-profile defec-
tors have become folk heroes to Cuban fans, who follow their careers 
in America despite the dearth of MLB information in Cuba's official 
media outlets.157 Yet, some cases exist in which the circumstances sur-
rounding a player's defection create animosity among Cuban fans 
148 See id. at 77-78; see generally ECHEVARRiA, supra note 27 (discussing Cuban baseball's 
illustrious history); Perez, supra note 29 (discussing baseball's relation to the birth of Cu-
ban nationalism). 
149 See JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 78. 
150 See HANNUM, supra note 140, at 4. 
151 See, e.g., FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 115 (describing how Castro de-
nounced defector Rolando Arrojo as "a Judas who sold himself for twelve gold coins"); 
JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 78 (noting that government officials dubbed Arocha a traitor after 
his defection). 
152 See JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 88; McKinley Jr., supra note 12. 
153 JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 77. 
154 See id. at 47 (noting that Cubans followed defector Livin Hernandez during the 
1997 World Series despite a media blackout). 
155 See id. at 55. 
156 See id. at 77. 
157 See id. at 47-48; see McKinley Jr., supra note 12. 
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and, to a greater extent, the player's teammates. 158 Players who defect 
while representing Cuba in a foreign tournament are often the targets 
of derision and scorn.159 
While no player has ever publicly expressed regret about his deci-
sion to defect, it is clear that rejecting the patlia-Ieaving Cuba for-
ever-is tormenting for the young players who decide to do SO.160 As 
Rene Arocha eloquently put it: 
[Defecting] is a very difficult decision .... You have to have 
an inner strength-it's incredible the strength you have to 
have to leave behind not only your family-although leaving 
your family is difficult-but to leave your roots, something 
that is yours, and to understand that you don't know when 
you will be able to return.161 
Until the system is altered, baseball defectors can never return to 
Cuba.162 And "the idea that they may never return home," author Mil-
ton Jamail posits, is something that "Cuban defectors ... don't get 
over. "163 Worse yet, defection often leads to the prolonged separation 
of a player from his family.164 
B. Defection and the Separation of Families 
For Cuban defectors and their families, the most devastating as-
pect of the current system is that it forces virtually every player to 
abandon his family indefinitely.165 A select few are able to leave with 
158 Sec. e.g., FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 115 (quoting Cuban national team 
pitcher Lazaro Valle, criticizing Rolando Arrojo for defecting on the eve of the Olympics: 
"It was the way he did it. ... He betrayed everyone .... Even if he makes a hundred million 
dollars, he'll never be a hero in Cuba because he was like a Judas. He sold everybody 
out. ");JAMAIL, supm note 8, at 55 (quoting Aurelio Alonzo, a member of an officially regis-
tered baseball fan organization in Cuba: "\\'e do not question [Livan Hernandez's) deci-
sion to leave .... That is his personal choice. vVe only question the method by which he 
chose to leave: while represen ting his cOlin try abroad."). 
159 Sec supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
160 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 73-89. 
161 Id. at 78. 
162 Sec id. at 73-89. 
163 Letta Tayler, Price of Defection: Contreras'Daughters, Wife Battle Loneliness, NEWSDAY, 
July 29,2003, at A76. 
164 Sec McKinley Jr., supra note 12. 
165 Sec, e.g., id.; Wright Thompson, The Long Road from Las fl,fartinas, KAN. CITY STAR, 
Mar. 30, 2003, at 122. 
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their family, often by boat.1OO Among the rest, only a small proportion 
reunite with loved ones shordy after defecting, while others may be 
reunited after months or even years.167 For many Cuban defectors, 
however, the separation goes on indefinitely, with no way of knowing 
if, or when, it will end. l68 Thus, the system egregiously violates the 
principle of family unity, a principle that requires countries to avoid 
implementing policies that cause the dispersion of families.169 
The tragic case of Chicago White Sox pitcher Jose Contreras, 
originally signed by the New York Yankees after his October 2002 de-
fection, is instructive. Although news accounts at the time typically 
emphasized Contreras' $32 million contract, his chief concern cen-
tered around reuniting with his wife and children.17o Throughout the 
negotiations during the fall of 2002 and winter of 2003, the pitcher 
"stressed the importance of his family" and "asked teams for help in 
getting [them] out of Cuba."171 Contreras had left his wife, two 
daughters, ages ten and two, and an extended family.172 The Yankees, 
powerless to intervene in immigration matters, were unable to guar-
antee Contreras a family reunion. 173 
Contreras kept secret his plan to defect from his family, and his 
wife was furious when he first called home after defecting.174 As spring 
training began in 2003, Contreras explained that his separation from 
his family had been "very difficult. ... [T]he only time I don't think 
about my family is when I'm on the mound. "175 Toward the end of 
spring training, the pitcher was informed that his father-a proud 
supporter of Castro-had been rushed to the hospital,176 Contreras' 
subdued response was, "I can't do anything about it .... I can only 
166 See Rafael Hermoso, TealllS in tlte Majors Waiting for 2 Cubans, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, 
Dec. 17, 2003, at C8 (noting that Maels Rodriguez and Yobal Duenas defected by boat with 
their wives). 
167 See. e.g., FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 113-14 (describing Arrojo's reunion 
with his wife and daughters, who had been smuggled out of Cuba the same day Arrojo 
defected); id. at 299 (describing El Duque's reunion with his mother and daughters in 
October 1998, approximately ten months after his defection). 
168 See, e.g., Yankees Pitcher Contreras Can't Get Family Out of Cuba, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 
20, 2004, at C2 [hereinafter Contreras Can't Get Family]; McKinley Jr., supra note 12. 
169 See FOURLANOS, supra note 141, at 109. 
170 See Kepner, supra note 133. 
l7l [d. 
172 See Thompson, supra note 165. 
m See Kepner, supra note 133. 
174 SeeThompsol1, supra note 165. 
175 Tayler, supra note 163. 
176 Gordon Edes, For Contreras, a No-Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 4, 2003, at Fl; see 
Thompson, supra note 165. 
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confront American capitalism and the fast-paced world of professional 
basebalJ.l98 These players, some only teenagers, must leave parents, 
siblings, and extended family at a particularly tumultuous and chal-
lenging time in their lives. 199 They must make a wrenching choice: 
either remain with their families or pursue the increased freedom and 
prosperity of a professional baseball career.200 Often, those players 
choosing freedom and prosperity are ill-equipped to make the transi-
tion from their prior life in Cuba, which had neither. 201 
Agents often compound this problem by enticing players to de-
fect, inflating their capabilities, helping them sign a professional con-
tract, and abruptly moving on to the next big catch.202 Few constraints 
exist to prevent agents from surrendering an unprepared player to 
the demanding world of professional baseball once they cash in on 
their commission-and some agents do just that.203 Many players have 
great difficulty adjusting to their new environment, and their inability 
to visit and draw strength from their families further hampers this 
process.204 
Family separation is even more tragic when one considers the 
high rate of failure among MLB prospects.205 Most Cuban defectors 
never playa game at the major league level, and those who do reach 
MLB can be hampered by injuries or, for older players, age-related 
decline.206 Thus, though every defector leaves his family behind for a 
chance at the big leagues, few actually cash in on that chance.207 And 
though the political and economic freedoms in America far surpass 
198 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 109-12. 
199 See id. 
200 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 78. 
201 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 111. AI Ayila, scouting director for the 
Florida Marlins, explains Livan Hernandez's period of adjustment: 
It was very tough for him in the beginning .... People were trying to get him. 
It's no easy task for a young man, twenty years old, when all you know is a 
fucking dictator, a country where there is practically no information, and all 
of a sudden you're thrown into this big old world. I mean, inlagine what it was 
like for this guy. He just left Cuba, and now he's in the United States and he's 
got nobody. It's like, "\\;bo the fuck do I trust?" 
Id. 
202 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 109;JAMAIL. supra note 8, at 83. 
203 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 109-11. 
204 See Keyin Baxter, For Cuban Athletes Who Deject, Success in Sports is Elusive, MIAMI 
HERALD, June 2, 2002, at lA. 
205 See id. 
206 See, e.g.,JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 73-80; Baxter, supra note 204. 
207 See Baxter, supra note 204. 
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those in Cuba, it is questionable whether players would be as eager to 
leave Cuba if given a realistic assessment of their chances of success.208 
Yet, asking whether or not the trade-off-giving up one's family 
for a chance to play professionally in America-is worthwhile seems to 
be the wrong question to ask.209 A better question might be why Cu-
bans are the only ballplayers on the planet who are forced to choose 
between their families and professional baseball.210 The very fact that 
young Cuban ballplayers must make this forced choice is ample evi-
dence that the system is broken and needs to be overhauled.211 
Even more soberingly for some Cuban defectors, choosing to 
leave their family behind is only the beginning of their travails.212 For 
those who defect by sea, the biggest obstacles still lie ahead.213 
C. Defection by Sea: Danger in the Straits of Florida 
Sea defections are notoriously fraught with danger, a fact evi-
denced by the numerous press accounts of desperate Cubans risking 
life and limb for a chance to reach Florida's shores.214 For baseball 
fans, Orlando "El Duque" Hernandez's defection is perhaps the best-
known tale of a baseball player taking to the sea to escape from 
Cuba.215 Yet most defecting players do not resort to such drastic 
measures.216 Since most defectors play for Cuban teams who travel 
outside of the country, they need only find an opportune time to walk 
away.217 Consequently, only a select few of the approximately sixty Cu-
ban baseball defectors have resorted to escape via boat or raft.218 
208 See id. 
209 Cf JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 132 (noting Congressman Jose Serrano's opinion that 
Cuban ballplayers ought not have to defect at all). 
210 See id. North Korean athletes also must defect if they wish to play sports in America, 
but so far no baseball players have emerged from that country. See id. at 165 n.7. 
2ll See id. at 132. 
212 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 191-221. 
213 See id. 
214 See gencrally ALFREDO A. FERNANDEZ, ADRIFT: THE CUBAN RAFT PEOPLE (2000). 
215 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supm note 13, at 203-12 (recounting El Duque's arduous 
voyage); see also Olney, supm note 133. 
216 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 77. 
217 See id. As discussed above, Rene Arocha walked out of an airport during a layover. 
Robb, supra note 1. Pitching star Rolando Arrojo escaped from his team's hotel while play-
ing in the United States. See Berkow, supra note 126. 
218 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 77 (explaining that most Cuban ballplayers who wish to 
defect do not take to the sea, because most play for Cuban teams that frequently compete 
outside of the country); Baxter, mpra note 204 (noting that approximately sixty baseball 
players have defected since Rene Arocha). 
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vVhen the Castro regime bans those it suspects of planning defec-
tion from playing for traveling Cuban teams, however, it eliminates 
the "walk away" defection option.219 For the banned players who want 
a shot in professional baseball, the dangerous water route becomes 
their only escape from an impoverished life devoid of basebalJ.220 So 
long as the Cuban government maintains its strict policy of banning 
from baseball those suspected of defecting, there will be players will-
ing to risk sea voyage. 221 
Tales of defection by sea are harrowing.222 El Duque and his 
companions spent nearly four days on a remote deserted island in the 
Bahamas after a failed rendezvous with the boat that was supposed to 
transport them the rest of the way to Florida.223 The defectors sub-
sisted on Spam, sugar, and boiled conch that had been peeled off of 
rocks before they were rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard and taken to 
a detention center in Freeport, Bahamas.224 
Alex Sanchez, the current centerfielder for the Detroit Tigers, 
was eighteen years old when he and ten others boarded a rickety raft 
219 Sec, e.g., Paul Gutierrez, They Have Found the H'tzy Home, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at 
D3 (describing how prominent Cuban players Evel Bastida and Mayque Quintero made 
their decision to defect by boat after being suspended amid suspicion they were planning 
to defect); Serge F. Kovaleski, Cubans Rescued By Fishing Crew in Nick of Time, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 24, 1998, at A12 (reporting on four Cuban baseball players in a Bahamian detention 
camp who had defected by boat after being banned amid suspicion they were planning to 
defect). 
220 See Gutierrez, supra note 219 (explaining that Bastida and Quintero "left because 
they had no other options" after being suspended from baseball). Bastida is quoted as 
saying: 
I played baseball since I was 9 years old and I had no other way to support my 
family .... My mother-in-law helped, but I was still feeling pressure .... It was 
painful, but it won't be in vain. I hope to have them here soon. 
Id. The story of Bastida's and Quintero's voyage is not atypical, as they joined 25 strangers 
on a unreliable motor boat. See id. The boat's engine failed the first night, forcing the crew 
to paddle the rest of the way. Sec id. After almost three days, the boat landed safely in Key 
West, Florida. See id. Foiled by MLB in their attempt to sign contracts as free agents, the 
plavers established residency in Mexico while playing in the Mexican League. Sec id. They 
eventually signed with the Sonoma County (Cal.) Crushers, a professional team in the 
independent \V'estern League. See id. 
221 SeeJ'l.MAIL, supra note 8, at 90 (noting that EI Duque "had no choice but to get out 
of Cuba" and remarking that the author was naive to think that "Cuban authorities might 
just give [EI Duque] an exit visa and let him leave"). 
222 Sec, e.g., FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 203-12 (recounting EI Duque's voy-
age); Charles F. Gardner & Ana M. Menendez, Hope Floats, MILWAUKEE]' SENTINEL, Apr. 5, 
2002, at lC (recounting then-Milwaukee Brewers' centerfielder Alex Sanchez'sjourney). 
223 FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 203-12. 
224 Id. at 206-11. 
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held together with tire tubes, bolts, and ropes.225 As Sanchez tells it, 
"We spent three days at sea, and it was a pretty dangerous trip. From 
there, the U.S. Coast Guard picked us up and took us to the base at 
Guantanamo, and I was there 16 months."226 
Cuban national team first baseman Jorge Luis Toea, along with 
three other players, a coach, and four crew members, were also lucky 
to have escaped disaster during their flight from Cuba.227 But for the 
keen eyes of some Bahamian lobstermen who noticed a small light 
several hundred yards away, the entourage likely would have been 
lost.228 When they were rescued in the darkness, the Cubans' dilapi-
dated, single-engine boat was ankle deep in water and sinking fast. 229 
The defectors had brought little more than fresh water for provisions 
and had no navigational equipment.23o The lobstermen turned the 
nine Cubans over to Bahamian authorities the next day, who took the 
group to a detention center in Nassau.231 
The stories of EI Duque, Sanchez, and Toca also highlight how 
repatriation treaties between Cuba and its neighbors often cause seri-
ous problems for sea defectors.232 Primarily, players that are inter-
dicted or turned over to authorities are placed in notoriously un-
pleasant detention camps, sometimes for months on end.233 
Moreover, because the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and the 
United States have each agreed to repatriate Cuban refugees that are 
denied asylum, such players may be returned to Cuba.234 This was 
precisely the fate of Toca's four companions after their detention in 
the Bahamas.235 After several months in a detention camp, the defec-
tors-along with dozens of others-were denied asylum and returned 
to Cuba per the Bahamian repatriation agreemen t. 236 After their re-
225 Gardner & Menendez, supm note 222. 
226 [d. 
227 See Kovaleski, supm note 219. 
228 See id. 
229 [d. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
232 See, e.g., FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supm note 13, at 210-17; JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 95-
96; Gardner & Menendez, supm note 222; see also Cwiertny, supm note 10, at 417-2l. 
233 See, e.g., JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 95-96; Kovaleski, supm note 219. See generally Har-
old Hongju Koh, America's Offthore Refugee Camps, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 139 (1994). 
234 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 212; Cv.'iertny, supra note 10, at 419-20. 
235 See JAMAIL, supm note 8, at 95-96. Because Toca had a Japanese wife, he was 
granted permission to leave the Bahamas and go to Japan. See id. His four companions 
were forced to remain in detention until they were repatriated. See id. 
236 See id. 
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turn, the defectors were banned from playing baseball, allegedly 
threatened, and placed under surveillance.237 Only their daring "re-
defection" several months later-by small boat, of course-allowed 
the group to escape further persecution by the Castro regime.238 
Repatriation, however, is not always a foregone conclusion.239 
American authorities are more inclined to grant asylum to Cuban 
baseball players due to legal, political, and humanitarian motiva-
tions.240 Because Cuban baseball players have a prominent political 
role in their homeland, repatriated ballplayers are prime targets for 
post-repatriation persecution.241 Furthermore, the high profile of de-
fectors in Florida's Cuban-American community ensures that any de-
cision to deny asylum would subject the U.S. government to biting 
cri ticism. 242 
As much as the current defection system complicates enforce-
ment of regional immigration law, it weighs far more heavily on the 
impoverished Cubans who risk everything for a chance to play in 
America.243 There is no doubt that defection by sea poses significant 
risks for those who attempt it, and not all sea escapes end as success-
237 See Pressley, supra note 13. 
238 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 97; Pressley, supra note 13. 
239 See, e.g., FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 210-17; Gardner & Menendez, supra 
note 222. 
240 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 215-16; Pressley, supra note 13; see also su-
pra notes 7, 61 and accompanying text. 
241 See Pressley, supra note 13; supra notes 7, 61 and accompanying text. 
242 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 215-16 (noting that while he was de-
tained in the Bahamas, El Duque's predicament became a "cause celebre" and that the 
Cuban-American community "mobilized its all-star team of anti-Castro hard-liners" to 
lobby the U.S. government to extend humanitari;m parole immedi,tely). Despite these 
considerations, the United States has repatri,ted Cuban ballplayers interdicted at sea. See 
Scorecard: Defector Sent HOllle: Cuban Throwback, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 19, 2000, at 34, 
34. Favorable treatment for ballplayers, even if they do face a greater risk of persecution in 
Cuba, raises difficult questions of fairness and parti,lity vis-a-vis "average" detainees. See 
Commentary, The Cubans Who D01l't Play Baseball, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at A20 
[hereinafter Commentary, The Cubans Who Don't Play Baseball]; cf FAINARU & SANCHEZ, 
supra note 13, at 217 ("Also looking on were dozens of other rafters who had drifted to the 
Bahamas in much the same fashion [as El Duque]. Many had been there for months. As 
television cameras filmed El Duque's exit [from the Bahamian detention camp], one refu-
gee held up a towel bearing a hand-scrawled message: FREEDOM FOR ALL THE CUBANS."). 
Dealing with Cuban baseball detainees is a very delicate issue for American authorities, 
who want to offer asylum but wish to avoid the appearance of a double-standard. See 
Commentary, The Cubans l"'ho Don 't Play Baseball, supra; cf FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 
13, at 293-94 (noting how State Department offici,ls were worried that if they allowed El 
Duque's family to come into the country, the press would "write how Mr. Six Million Dol-
lars can get his kids into the United States and Jose in Mi,mi can't"). 
243 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 419-20; McKinley Jr., supra note 12. 
412 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:383 
fully as those documented above.244 There is also little doubt that such 
defections will continue.245 But even if players avoid the physical dan-
gers of sea defection and the possibility of detention and repatria-
tion-other legal landmines, particularly those associated with immi-
grant smuggling, may await. 
D. The Unique Pmblem of Immigrant Smuggling 
Smuggling is an increasingly popular method of illegally trans-
porting immigrants from Cuba to Florida.246 Instances of human 
smuggling have risen in conjunction with the growing failure of "ama-
teur" boaters and rafters to evade American patrols in the Straits of 
Florida.247 To avoid repatriation under the United States' "wet feet, 
dry feet" policy, Cuban emigrants resort to the only consistently reli-
able method for reaching dry land: professional smuggling.248 Profes-
sional smugglers have navigational expertise, underground logistical 
networks in both Cuba and Florida that allow for effective coordina-
tion, and superior vessels for avoiding the authorities.249 
Professional smuggling differs in many respects from amateur 
escape attempts via boat or raft.250 While amateur escapes carry a 
greater risk of repatriation, injury, or, at worst, death, virtually none 
result in prosecutions under federal law.251 The reverse is true of 
smuggling operations, which probably carry a lower risk of repatria-
tion, injury, or death, but are blatantly illegal and often prosecuted.252 
244 See Brown, supra note 67, at 273-74 (detailing the December 2001 capsizing of an 
overcrowded boat filled with Cubans that killed thirty); Pingeton, supra note 64, at 329 
(noting that Cubans risk their lives to cross the "treacherous" Straits of Florida and that 
only an estimated one in four rafters survives the journey). 
245 See JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 89; Hermoso, supra note 166 (describing how those who 
defected by boat with Maels Rodriguez and Yobal Duenas "asked that their exact route 
remain private to protect future Cuban defectors who might take a similar route"). 
246 Brown, supra note 67, at 274 (noting that human smuggling has flourished in the 
Straights of Florida since 1998). 
247 See Brown, supra note 67, at 278-80. 
248 SeeJoint Statement, supra note 68, at 328; Brown, supra note 67, at 279. 
249 See id. 
250 Sue Anne Pressley, Faster Boats Carry Cubans, Haitians to Florida, WASH. POST, Dec. 
31, 1998, at A2 (noting that "fast-moving motor vessels" are replacing Cuban emigrants' 
"flimsy rafts" and discussing the implications of this change). 
251 See Brown, supra note 67, at 278 (noting that "U.S. Forces efficiently detect, recover, 
and return most rafters to Cuba"); Pingeton, supra note 64, at 329. 
252 See Brown, supra note 67, at 280 (noting that smuggling operations are "presumed 
to be very successful"); id. at 286-90 (discussing the prosecution of suspected smugglers); 
see also, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 1135 (11th Cir. 2004) (dis-
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Moreover, despite the conventional wisdom that smuggling is safer 
and more likely to be successful than amateur defection, there are 
nonetheless serious physical dangers involved.253 Since maximizing 
profit is the only true concern of professional smugglers, boats are 
often overcrowded and lack basic safety equipment such as life jack-
ets.254 Some smuggling operations have gone terribly awry, resulting 
in dozens of deaths. 255 
Baseball's defection system promotes the practice of human 
smuggling in two ways. First, touted Cuban ballplayers, financed by 
wealthy agents, are themselves candidates to be smuggled across the 
Straits of Florida.256 Second, a defector's family may be smuggled into 
the United States for reunification purposes.257 Although aiding a 
player in his quest for freedom and reuniting families might seem like 
noble goals, the dangers and unregulated nature of human smuggling 
outweigh its benefits.258 Put simply, human smugglers "are not hu-
manitarians. They're criminals. "259 
Despite the unsavory nature of trafficking in human cargo, Cu-
ban ballplayers-especially those who cannot or do not journey 
abroad with a traveling squad-remain prime candidates for a smug-
gling operation.260 Although the passage is by no means safe, traveling 
cussing facts behind prosecution of immigrant smuggler); United States v. Saintil, i53 F.2d 
984,985 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing the same). 
253 See Brown, supra note 6i, at 280. 
254 See id.; Pressley, supra note 250 (quoting a Coast Guard officer: "A big concern we 
see quite often is when we stop them at sea and we notice grossly overloaded vessels. Most 
of those vessels do not have life jackets, and conditions can change so drastically out 
there"). 
255 See Brown, supra note 6i, at 2i3-74; Pressley, supra note 250 (noting that in 1998, 
three smuggling operations inmlved the loss of life, including one case in which at least 
eight passengers perished after an overcrowded boat capsized on December Ii). 
256 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 106 ("As Cubas' notoriety grew, the 
smugglers, recognizing a lucrative new market, began to come out of the woodwork to 
offer the agent deals to pull the valuable ballplayers out of Cuba."). 
257 See id. (noting that Cubas' associate planned "to hire a smuggler to sail to Cuba, 
pick up Arrojo's wife and children under the nose of the Cuban coast guard, and then 
ferry them to a drop-off poin t in the Florida Keys."). 
258 See Mildrade Cherfils, Rise in Smuggling of Cubans Worries u.s., Refilgee Groups, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, July 22, 1999, at A19; Pressley, supra note 250; see also Brown, supra note 6i, at 
2i3-74. 
259 Cherfils, supra note 258 (quoting Elena Freyre, executive director of the Miami 
office of the Cuban Committee for Democracy). 
260 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 106. As discussed above, those who are 
banned from playing baseball in Cuba have virtually no option but to escape by sea. See 
supra notes 219-221 and accompanying text. Because these players are of great potential 
value to their agents, the agents are more likely to advocate and finance smuggling the 
player out of Cuba rather than allow the player to make a riskier, amateur escape. Cf FAI-
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with a seasoned smuggler who knows the route and claims to possess a 
reliable boat seems far less risky than the ad hoc escapes attempted by 
EI Duque, Sanchez, and Toca.261 Furthermore, agents-who stand to 
benefit handsomely from prospective defectors' contracts-will likely 
be willing to front the otherwise prohibitive cost of the smuggling op-
eration.262 
The families of ballplayers are also likely candidates to be smug-
gled out of Cuba, since most defectors must leave their family be-
hind.263 It is virtually impossible for players who have defected to get 
their families out of Cuba legally.264 Defection, considered a grievous 
crime against the revolution, renders Cuban authorities unlikely to 
allow the families of players to leave freely.265 Most players, therefore, 
have little choice but to turn to smuggling if they wish for their fami-
lies to escape.266 
NARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 181-82 (discussing aJoe Cubas plan-which ultimately 
fizzled-to pay a smuggler $lO,OOO to get El Duque out of Cuba). 
261 See supra notes 249-252 and accompanying text. 
262 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at lO6-O8. According to interviews con-
ducted by authors Steve Fainaru and Ray Sanchez for their book The Duke of Havana, the 
cost of smuggling is somewhere in the range of $3,000 to $20,000 per person. See id. at 107. 
Newspaper reports document a narrower range: $7,000 to $lO,OOO per person. See Cherfils, 
supra note 258; Pressley, supra note 250. By 1996, Joe Cubas was well known in Miami, al-
legedly receiving two to three calls a week from potential smugglers hoping to ferry one of 
his Cuban prospects to Florida. FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at lO6. One such 
smuggler was even armed with the telephone numbers of references in case Cubas and his 
associates wanted to research the smuggler's "great track record." Id. 
263 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 106; see also, e.g., McKinley Jr., supra note 
12 (describing how Rey Ordonez left his family behind to defect); Thompson, supra note 
165 (describing how Jose Contreras left his family behind to defect). 
264 See, e.g., FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 286 (noting the difficulty of getting 
El Duque's family out of Cuba, considering the pitcher's highly publicized fallout with 
Cuban authorities and subsequent defection); Contreras Can't Get Family, supra note 168 
(reporting that Jose Contreras' family had been refused permission to leave twice and 
would have to wait four more years before reapplying). 
265 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 286; Contreras Can 'f Get Family, supra note 
168. In the exceptional case of El Duque, the pitcher's politically powerful allies managed 
to convince Castro to allow his family to come to America. See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra 
note 13, at 284-300. With the help of Professor Pamela Falk from the City University of 
New York, El Duque obtained the valuable aid of longtime Castro acquaintance Cardinal 
John O'Connor, the Roman Catholic archbishop of New York. See id. at 285, 287. Cardinal 
O'Connor wrote a formal request to Castro to allow El Duque's ex-wife, two daughters, and 
mother to come to the United States. See id. at 289. After some prodding by the arch-
bishop's Hispanic liaison during a meeting in Cuba, Castro consented. See id. at 289-93. 
266 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at lO6, 114 (discussing the smuggling of Ar-
rojo's family); McKinley Jr., supra note 12; see also Brown, supra note 67, at 278-80 (discuss-
ing smuggling's emergence as the preferred method of illegal immigration from Cuba to 
the United States). 
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Thus, ballplayers and their agents sometimes arrange and pay 
professional smugglers-operating almost exclusively out of Miami-
to bring the players' families from Cuba to Florida.267 The smuggling 
operation carries attendant dangers beyond the physical risk to those 
aboard the boat.26B By planning and providing payment for the activi-
ties, the players and their agents expose themselves to serious crimi-
nal penalties under federal law. 269 Conspiring with or abetting an im-
migrant smuggler is punishable by a hefty fine and up to ten years in 
prison.270 If disaster strikes during the trip and results in death to any 
passenger, those responsible for arranging or funding the voyage 
could be punished by life imprisonment, or even death.271 
No baseball player has ever been charged for violating immigrant 
smuggling laws, nor is such a situation likely, for two principle rea-
sons.272 First, recurring evidentiary dilemmas make smuggling prose-
cutions extremely difficult. 273 Smuggling operations involving players 
and their families remain, for obvious reasons, concealed by a shroud 
of secrecy.274 Those privy to sensitive information almost invariably 
deny any knowledge of the operation.275 This is done as much to avoid 
the scrutiny of American authorities as it is to protect allies and 
sources in Cuba, where the possibility of detection, and the resulting 
penalties, are even more acute.276 Second, the United States Attor-
ney's Office for the Southern District of Florida usually pursues only 
cases of for-profit trips involving death or bodily injury.277 South Flor-
ida juries are notoriously more sympathetic to smugglers who are at-
267 See Brown, supra note 67, at 286 n.68; McKinley Jr., supra note 12. 
268 See Cherfils, supra note 258. 
269 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2003). 
270 Seeid. § 1324(a)(I)(A)(v), (a)(I)(B). 
271 See id. § 1324(a)(l) (B)(iii)-(iv). 
272 Cf Brown, supra note 67, at 286-90 (discussing the difficulty of prosecuting smug-
glers). 
273 See id. at 287-88. 
274 See McKinley Jr., supra note 12. 
275 See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 114 ("Years later, Cubas and Arrojo, both 
aware of the criminal implications, would deny ever smuggling the pitcher's family into the 
United States.") Despite this official denial, Cubas-enamored with his delusional ·007" 
image-never kept the smuggling operation much of a secret, spilling details to various 
journalists and associates. See id. 
276 See id. at 114, 187 (describing alleged smuggler Rene Valle's run-in with the Cuban 
authorities while he was attempting to transport members of his family, resulting in three 
years in a Cuban prison); McKinley Jr., supra note 12 (describing the Cuban government's 
heavy surveillance and intense scrutiny of three defectors' wives before they were success-
fully smuggled to Florida). 
277 See Brown, supra note 67, at 286. 
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tempting to help Cubans flee from the widely detested Castro re-
gime.278 Given this truth, it is extremely unlikely that a jury would 
convict a professional baseball player for arranging to reunify his fam-
ily.279 
Yet, the mere improbability that a player or his agent will be 
charged for immigrant smuggling does not merit disregard of the 
problem.280 The law prohibiting human trafficking need not be sys-
tematically and vigorously enforced-especially against sympathetic 
ballplayers-for the safety-oriented policies underlying the law to have 
value.281 At the very least, the strong likelihood that professional 
baseball players have engaged in criminal behavior under federal law 
warrants MLB's attention.282 MLB should feel compelled to attempt 
system-wide change for the physical safety of Cuban players and their 
families. The league's failure even to begin to address this life-or-
death issue further attests to its broken Cuban policy.283 
278 See id. at 287-88; see also David L. Marcus, Legal Chaos Leaves Cuban Refugees Adrift, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2,1998, at Al (quoting a Miami-based federal prosecutor: "There are 
many cases that we know in our heart of hearts are good cases, but you pick these jurors 
and none of them want to convict. ... Jurors say, 'We've got violent crime, we've got drugs, 
we've got kilos of cocaine falling out of the sky, and you're going to give me someone 
smuggling some poor people out of Cuba?'"). 
279 Cf Brown, supra note 67, at 287-88 (noting that South Florida juries are sympa-
thetic toward Cuban immigrant smugglers). 
280 Cf id. at 287-90 (discussing the difficulties in prosecuting smuggling cases but also 
examining various methods for improving law enforcement efforts in this area). 
281 Cf id. at 289-90 (arguing in favor of a comprehensive program to reduce immi-
grant smuggling that would result in fewer "day-to-day interdictions, but more comprehen-
sive prosecutions and substantial penalties in future cases"). 
282 Cf Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 409-11 (discussing MLB's swift reaction to the Los 
Angeles Dodgers' violation of the Cuban embargo law and MLB rules). 
283 Cf id. at 423-25 (asserting that MLB has been aware of violations of the Kuhn Di-
rective and the embargo but has taken no action to resolve the problem). The most publi-
cized violation of the embargo and the Kuhn Directive was the Los Angeles Dodgers' in-
volvement with Cuban prospects Juan Carlos Diaz and Josue Perez. See, e.g., Joe 
Christensen, Dodgers Lose Two Cubans, PRESS ENTER. (Riverside, Cal.),June 29, 1999, at Cl; 
Steve Fainaru, LA Loses Millar Leaguers: Dodgers Punished for Holding Secret Tryouts, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 28, 1999, at Dl; Bill Plaschke, Liberty-And Justice-For All, L.A. TIMES, June 
30, 1999, at Bl. Dodgers' officials held secret tryouts in Cuba for the two players, helped 
them to defect, and instructed them to lie about it if asked. Christensen, supra. MLB's 
unprecedented punishment of the club included a $200,000 fine, a sLx-month ban on sign-
ing foreign players, and stripping the club of the two illegally scouted players, who were 
granted free agency. Hal Bodley, Selig's Siglling Ban Punishes Dodgers, USA TODAY, July 2, 
1999, at 8C; see generally Cwiertny, supra note 10. 
The Dodgers' scandal is but one particularly egregious anecdote, but is by no means 
the only direct involvement by MLB teams in Cuba. See Wright Thompson, A Tough Out: 
Scouts Lead a Dangerous Life in Cuba, MN. CITY STAR, Mar. 30, 2003, at 124. Among baseball 
officials, little doubt exists that undercover MLB scouts currently operate in Cuba. Id. Ac-
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cording to sports agent Joe Kehoskie, "I've heard of 50 different scouts going to Cuba on 
the sly, still in violation of Major League Baseball rules ... but I've never heard of a long-
term payroll type of situation." Id. (noting that Cuban baseball expert and author Peter 
Bjarkman believes that while teams have no full-time scouts "who collect benefits and walk 
around with a stop watch," many have sources-50-called "bird dogs "-in Cuba). 
Agent-affiliated scouts, or agents acting as scouts themselves, also scour the country-
side to find the next player to bring in a multi-million dollar contract. See FAINARU & 
SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 139 (explaining how a former associate of Cubas, Juan Ignacio 
Hernandez Nodar began to "explore his own business opportunities" in Cuba, meeting 
with players in their home, handing out money, and urging them to defect); Thompson, 
supra. These "agent-scouts," rather than those from MLB teams, attract the most attention 
from Cuban authorities because they often have ties to anti-Castro elements in Miami and 
are associated with players who have already defected. See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 
13, at 150 (remarking that the judges' written decision cOllYicting Nodar of tampering with 
baseball players noted his connection to anti-Castro agentJoe Cubas and defector Rolando 
Arrojo); Thompson, supra ("The Cubans do acknowledge that not all scouts are wannabe 
CIA. Authorities focus their attention on the scouts affiliated wi.th agents, not a baseball 
man with a notebook and a radar gun."). Because agents stand to profit handsomely from 
their clients' contracts, agent-scouts more aggressively encourage players to defect, often 
resorting to more extreme forms of corruption, including falsification of official docu-
ments and bribery. See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, at 139 (describing Nodar's ag-
gressive tactics); . cf id. at 119 (describing how Cubas and an associate bribed officials and 
prepared phony passports and birth certificates for players they were transporting from 
the Dominican Republic to Costa Rica). 
Even if Cuban authorities deny any focus on MLB scouts, these scouts almost certainly 
continue to violate the Kuhn Directive and Cuban embargo. See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 
401; Thompson, supra. And because the Cuban authorities are infamously unpredictable 
and harsh, MLB scouts in Cuba risk imprisonment. See FAINARU & SANCHEZ, supra note 13, 
at 138-52 (recounting Nodar's arrest, trial, and conviction); Thompson, supra (quoting 
Cuban Commissioner Rodriguez: "[Scouts that come to Cuba] are violating our laws, and 
they end up in jail"). Nodar, the notoriously conspicuous cousin of Joe Cubas, was engaged 
in freelance scouting when the Cuban government arrested him. Sec FAINARU & SANCHEZ, 
supra note 13, at 138-42. He was tried for tampering v.ith players, convicted, and sen-
tenced to fifteen years in a Cuban prison. Sec id. at 145-60; Thompson, supra. 
Although the risks of scouting in Cuba seem to outweigh the possible benefits, rudi-
mentary knowledge of the island's top prospects is indispensable for every MLB team, so 
as to prepare the team to compete for players' serivces if and when they escape. SeeJAMAIL, 
supra note 8, at 119-20; Thompson, supra. Ultimately, however, teams are anticipating the 
collapse of the Castro regime and the inevitable Cuban baseball "gold rush." Sec id. (quot-
ing Fred Claire, the former general manager and executive vice president of the Dodgers: 
"If the talent was available in Cuba, and all clubs could go in and scout, and sign or draft, I 
can only envision a gold rush"); Thompson, supra. The extent and depth of the baseball 
talent in Cuba is staggering; although it is impossible to ascertain how many Cuban ball-
players would play professionally in America, Cuba could become the primary provider of 
foreign talent to American professional baseball .. SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 120. The 
Dominican Republic, with a population of nearly nine million, has about fifteen hundred 
players signed to professional contracts in America. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
WORLD FACTBOOK 155 (2004) [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK]; JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 
120. Cuba, with its more highly-developed baseball system and population of over eleven 
million would, over time, almost certainly produce more professional ballplayers. WORLD 
FACTBOOK, supra, at 139; seeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 120. Therefore, as long as the defec-
tion system is operative, scouts will continue to circumvent, even break, league rules and 
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III. CAN THE CURRENT SYSTEM BE FIXED? 
Most commentators agree that the defection system is flawed-
albeit for differen t reasons-and some have offered suggestions for its 
cure.284 One critic, Cwiertny, suggests instituting a worldwide draft 
that would include players of foreign residency.285 Additionally, Grel-
ler proposes a four-part process that would: (1) end exclusionary 
practices by MLB, the United States, and Cuba; (2) include Cubans in 
the domestic amateur draft; (3) impose a contract tax on teams that 
sign Cuban players to support Cuban baseball infrastructure and 
scouting; and (4) change federal law to allow Cubans to play profes-
sionally in America without having to defect. 286 Although creative and 
ably supported, neither proposal has a realistic chance of solving the 
defection problem in the near future. 
A. A Worldwide Draft: Implications JOT Cuban Defectors 
The rapid influx of foreign ballplayers into the MLB ranks dur-
ing the 1990s prompted calls from team officials and outside com-
mentators alike for the implementation of a worldwide draft. 287 Theo-
retically, the plan would integrate foreigners into the domestic 
amateur draft, thus restricting eligible foreign players to negotiations 
only with the team that drafts them.288 Advocates typically promote 
the worldwide draft concept for its potential to improve parity by giv-
ing small-market teams an opportunity to draft and sign top foreign 
federal law to ensure their competitiveness in the Cuban baseball market. Cf. Cwiertny, 
supra note 10, at 424-25 (noting how Joe Cubas has been accused of violating the Kuhn 
Directive and the embargo). For the scouts of MLB teams, the system creates incentives to 
cheat to corner the market on certain players and funnel them cheaply and directly into 
the organization. See id. at 414. For agent-scouts like Joe Cubas and his associates, the sys-
tem creates incentives to cheat to corner the market on certain players, move them to a 
third country to gain free agent status, and earn lucrative commissions on high-priced 
professional contracts. See id. at 415-16. (redundant) Despite its knowledge of these cir-
cumstances, MLB has made no sserious attempts to alter the current system. See id. at 423-
25. 
284 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 425-27; Greller, supra note 10, at 1700-12; see alsoJA-
MAIL, supra note 8, at 131-41. 
285 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 425-27. 
286 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1700-12. 
287 See Bill Madden, Moving Toward a World Draft: Baseball Looks to Keep Big Market Teams 
from Stockpiling Cheap Talent, DAILY NEWS (N.Y), May 26, 1999, at 67; see also Weiss, supra 
note 15, at 129-133. 
288 SeeCwiertny, supra note 10, at 426-27. 
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prospects.289 Cwiertny, however, advocates establishing a worldwide 
draft to reduce or eliminate incentives for teams and agents to violate 
the Kuhn Directive and the Cuban embargo.29o 
A worldwide draft would greatly affect the current defection sys-
tem.291 Under a worldwide draft, Cubans would have no cause to es-
tablish foreign residency because all players would be forced to enter 
the draft, regardless ofresidency.292 Eliminating automatic free agency 
for foreign ballplayers would have several important effects on Cuban 
defectors. 293 First, the end of free agency would reduce the financial 
incentives for agents and scouts to aggressively and illegally pursue 
players in Cuba.294 Second, it would eliminate bidding wars for Cuban 
free agents living abroad, thus reducing incentives for agents to 
inflate players' capabilities so as to entice them to defect.295 Third, a 
worldwide draft would reduce incentives for MLB team scouts to vio-
late the Kuhn Directive and the Cuban embargo.296 Since all clubs 
would have access to every foreign player, individual teams might not 
benefit from planning or aiding defection.297 Thus, a worldwide draft 
would make it more likely that players will defect entirely of their own 
volition.298 Without prodding by self-interested scouts or agents and 
their often times dubious promises of glory and million dollar con-
289 See Madden, supra note 287. As it stands now, big-market teams-such as the New 
York Y'lnkees, the Los Angeles Dodgers, and the Boston Red Sox-have the financial abil-
ity not only to set up more sophisticated Latin American scouting operations, but also to 
outbid less wealthy teams when foreign players begin taking contract offers. See id.; see also 
Greller, supra note 10, at 1679-84 (describing how foreign free agency undermines com-
petith'e balance in l\ILB). Some experts, however, do not believe a worldwide draft would 
resolve the competitive balance issue. See Dave Shein in, Player Draft Remains Unsettled, 
WASH. POST, June 3, 2003, at D4. According to Jim Callis, the executive editor of Baseball 
America, "[Now, a small-market team] could find a [Latin American future star] and sign 
him for cheap. [Under a worldwide draft], they'd have to draft him and negotiate a big 
signing bonus." [d. Because of the high profile of Cuban baseball defectors, however, it is 
nearly impossible for teams to sign Cuban prospects cheaply and "under the radar" with-
out resorting to illegal tactics like those of the Dodgers. See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 401-
11. 
290 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 426-27. 
291 See id. 
292 See id. at 426; Shein in, supra note 289. 
293 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 426; Greller, supra note 10, at 1702-05. 
294 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 426. 
295 See id.; see alsoJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 83. 
296 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 426. 
297 See id. 
298 See id. at 427. 
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tracts, players might be better equipped to determine whether defec-
tion is the right choice for themselves and their families. 299 
But a worldwide draft could also cause negative consequences for 
Cuban ballplayers. From a humanitarian standpoint, a worldwide 
draft is not likely to improve the current system materially.30o Cwiertny 
aptly notes that under a worldwide draft system, MLB and the Major 
League Baseball Players' Association (MLBPA) would have to regulate 
agents dealing with Cuban players more vigorously to reduce agent 
profiteering and corruption.30! Together, stricter agent regulation 
and reduced-value contracts302 will almost certainly deter agents from 
helping players to defect.303 Without the help of an agent-or, more 
specifically, his bank account-many players will lack the financial re-
sources needed to defect successfully.304 Some players may attempt an 
"amateur" escape by sea, a far more dangerous option than alternative 
methods financed by a connected agent.305 Thus, by chilling agent 
involvement in Cuba, a draft might have the unfortunate effect of 
trapping more young ballplayers in their economically failing, 
authoritarian country. It is conceivable that a global draft will "cre-
ate [] more problems than it solves. "306 
299 See JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 83; Baxter, supra note 204. 
300 Cf Cwiertny, supra note lO, at 426-27 (omitting any mention of humanitarian 
benefits to players that might flow from implementation of a worldwide draft). 
301 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 426. 
302 See supra notes lO87, 131 and accompanying text (noting that players signed as free 
agents typically sign more lucrative contracts than those who are drafted). 
303 Cf Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 427 (noting that his proposal would "allow Cubans to 
defect on their own, if they chose to take such a risk") (emphasis added). 
304 Cf supra note 262 and accompanying text (noting that agents are willing to pay for 
smuggling operations which would otherwise be un affordable for Cuban ballplayers). 
305 See supra notes 222-231 and accompanying text. 
306 Sheinin, supra note 289 (quoting Baseball America editor Jim Callis). Despite the 
possible benefits for MLB, it is highly questionable whether a worldwide draft will be im-
plemented in the near future-or ever. See Gary Klein, Global Draft Is A Foreign Notion Still, 
L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at D6. Strong pockets of opposition to a worldwide draft within 
the professional baseball world make the ultimate institution of the draft an uncertainty. 
See Sheinin, supra note 289. Many MLB officials, agents, and the MLBPA have registered 
their philosophical opposition to the implementation of a global draft. See id. Naturally, 
big-market teams oppose the change, fearing an erosion of their long-cultivated scouting 
advantages in Latin America. See John Delcos, Baseball Feels a Draft Coming on, JOURNAL 
NEWS (Westchester Cty., N.Y.), Mar. 31, 2003, at 8K; Shein in, supra note 289. Also, many 
scouting directors question whether a worldwide draft would even resolve the competith'e 
balance problems it is intended to address. See Sheinin, supra note 289; Telephone Inter-
view with Ben Cherington, Director of Player Development, Boston Red Sox (Mar. I, 2004) 
[hereinafter Cherington Interview]. Furthermore, agents and ballplayers represented by 
the MLBPA dissent on a restraint-of-trade basis, since the draft would inevitably deflate 
contract and signing bonus values. See Klein, supra. 
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B. The Four-Step Plan: Realism 01' Idealism? 
As it stands, the defection system is primarily the product of two 
policies with origins on either side of the Straits of Florida: Castro's 
ban on professional sports and the United States' embargo on 
Cuba.307 Greller's four-part plan calls for, among other things, the 
revocation of Castro's ban and the modification of portions of the 
embargo affecting Cuban ballplayers.308 The plan certainly touches all 
the right bases, especially in light of recent Congressional actions that 
A worldwide draft also faces serious logistical hurdles. Sheinin, supra note 289. For in-
stance, owners and the MLBPA disagree over the appropriate number of rounds for a 
global draft. Klein, supra. MLB has also not decided whether, or how, it will reconcile dif-
ferent minimum age requirements for American, Canadian, and Puerto Rican players on 
the one hand and foreign players on the other, and experts question the feasibility of 
tracking and registering teenages in developing countries that lack basic governmental 
and baseball-related infrastructure. See Sheinin, supra note 289 (quoting agent Andy Mota: 
"I think the logistics of trying to track these kids down, especially in the Dominican Repub-
lic, will make it hard to implement .... How are you going to keep track of all these 16-
year-olds?") . 
Even if MLB can overcome philosophical and logistical opposition to a global draft, 
the league must contend with the real question of whether the draft is legal and enforce-
able. See Delcos, supra. The United States already has a treaty in place with Japan, the Re-
public of Korea, and Taiwan that prohibits "roster raiding" between the professional base-
ball leagues in each country. [d. These three Asian nations believe the treaty's provisions 
apply to amateur ballplayers, as well, making it likely that they would be excluded from any 
worldwide draft system. See id. With respect to those countries that would not be excluded 
from the draft by treaty, MLB would be treading on politically sensitive ground. Chering-
ton Interview, supra. V.'lrious labor- and foreign policy-related conflicts could arise from 
drafting players in foreign countries, especially those with developed professional baseball 
leagues. [d. MLB would be hard pressed to extend the draft to countries such as Mexico 
and the Dominican Republic, where rules already closely regulate whether and how teams 
from outside the country can sign native ballplayers. SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 139; Cher-
ington Interview, supra. As Y.'lnkees Assistant General Manager Jean Mterman explains, "I 
don't think there's any country out there that believes it would be subject to a worldwide 
draft." Delcos, supra. Thus, non-cooperation or outright hostility from other countries 
might be the most serious impediment to successfully implementing a global draft. See id. 
(quoting Mterman: "[T]he Dominican Republic ... is pitching a fit [that] they would be 
subject to a draft."). 
Perhaps the strong philosophical opposition to, as well as the inherent logistical and 
legal problems of a new system explain why MLB has made little progress in moving to-
ward a worldwide draft. See Delcos, supra; Klein, supra; Sheinin, supra note 289; !vILE Weighs 
Expo Decision, CINCINNATI POST, Jan. 16, 2004, at C3 [hereinafter lvlLB Wcighs Expo Deci-
sion]. Despite the August 2002 agreement between club owners and the MLBPA to explore 
the concept, as of spring training 2004 MLB was no closer to a new system, and MLB own-
ers have abandoned attempts to implement a worldwide draft for now. See Klein, supra; 
Expo Decision, supra (quoting executive vice president for baseball operations in the MLB 
commissioner's office, Sandy Alderson: "At this point, the clubs have indicated that they 
are not in a m~ority favoring a worldwide draft."). 
30i SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 129-141. 
308 Greller, supra note 10, at 1700-02. 
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indicate bipartisan support for relaxing the embargo's restrictions on 
travel to Cuba.309 But even if the United States were unilaterally to al-
ter the embargo in the manner that Greller envisions, it is highly im-
probable-the Castro regime's public statements to the contrary not-
withstanding-that Cubans will be allowed to play in America.3lO 
Absent a stunning reversal of Castro's long-standing socialist ideology 
and animus toward America-or, of course, his overthrow or death-
Cuban baseball defection is not likely to become a relic of history any-
time soon.311 
1. Changing MLB Policy to Accommodate Cuban Players 
The first three steps of Greller's plan consist chiefly of 
modifications of MLB rules with respect to Cuban players.312 Step one 
calls on MLB to revoke the Kuhn Directive, which prohibits teams 
from scouting and signing players in Cuba.313 Since the Directive is 
best viewed simply as MLB's reiteration of the restraints imposed by 
the Cuban embargo, such action would be relatively ineffectual.314 
That is, the Directive only prevents clubs from engaging in activities 
that would otherwise be prohibited by the Cuban embargo.315 Given 
the amount of untapped Cuban talent and the financial interests at 
stake for the league, MLB will almost certainly revoke the directive if 
and when Congress either alters the embargo to allow Cubans to play 
in America or lifts it altogether.316 Therefore, it would only be a sym-
309 See Pablo Bachelet, House Defies Bush 011 New Cuba Travel Ban, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 
22,2004, at A8; Emily Young, House GOP Objects to Lifting Cllba Travel Ban, PATRIOT LEDGER 
(Quincy, Mass.), Nov. 14,2003, at 4. 
310 See JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 131-37. Cuban Commissioner Humberto Rodriguez's 
public comment that Cuba would be "receptive to any proposal by the major leagues as 
long as it respects the principles of Cuban socialist sports" caused speculation in the press 
of a new relationship between Cuba and MLB. Cubans May Play ill lvlajors, SUN-SENTINEL 
(Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 31, 1998, at 7C. But Milton Jamail calls this claim "ludicrous," 
noting that Cuban officials want to give the impression of flexibility, when in reality any 
kind of opening would undermine the government's authoritarian grip on the country. See 
JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 131-32. 
311 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 138 ("Those interested in the return of Cuban players to 
major league baseball need to look to a Cuba ... without Fidel."). 
312 See Greller, sllpra note 10, at 1700-08. 
313Id. at 1700-02. 
314 Cherington Interview, supra note 306. 
315 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 401-09 (explaining how the Dodgers' recruitment 
and signing of players in Cuba-the very actions prohibited by the Kuhn Directive-vio-
lated the embargo). 
316 Cherington In terview, supra note 306; see supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
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bolic gesture to revoke the Kuhn Directive before the embargo is sub-
stantively altered to accommodate Cuban ballplayers.317 
Step two proposes that MLB incorporate Cuban players into the 
domestic amateur draft by amending the Official Professional Base-
ball Rules 3 and 4.318 Ostensibly, this would render the Cubas model 
of defection irrelevant, since Cubans would not be eligible to become 
free agents by moving to another country.319 From a practical stand-
point, this reform would have an identical effect on Cuban ballplayers 
as the worldwide draft, discussed above.32o While incorporating Cu-
bans into the domestic amateur draft would also reduce incentives for 
teams and agents to violate the embargo, by itself it would do nothing 
to end defection.321 And, like the worldwide draft, such a proposal, by 
discouraging agent involvement in the defection process, may cause 
players to choose more dangerous methods of defection, or not to 
defect at all. 322 As long as Cubans must defect to play in MLB, incor-
porating them into the domestic amateur draft might simply create 
problems to replace those it solves.323 
The third step calls for MLB to impose a "Cuban contract tax" 
upon teams that sign Cuban players.324 A small percentage of the total 
dollar value of each Cuban contract would be redirected to an MLB 
fund designed to support Cuban baseball infrastructure and MLB 
scouting and development in Cuba.325 Greller asserts that the resul-
tant funds would "not go to the Cuban government, but rather will 
remain under the auspices of MLB while directly going to the Cuban 
people through baseball. "326 
Unfortunately, this tax plan would be impossible to enact in its 
current form, because it ignores the dominance of the Castro gov-
ernment over Cuban baseball.327 Because the government exerts con-
trol over every sports academy, baseball field, piece of equipment-
317 Cherington Interyiew, supra note 306. 
318 Greller, supra note 10, at 1702-05. 
319 See id. at 1703. 
320 See Cwiertny, supra note 10, at 427 (noting that a worldwide draft would eliminate 
free agency for foreign players); Greller, supra note 10, at 1703 (noting that incorporating 
Cuban players into the draft would eliminate Cubas' method of defection); supra notes 
287-306 and accompanying text. 
321 See supra notes 291-299 and accompanying text. 
322 See supra notes 300-306 and accompanying text. 
323 See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
324 Greller, supra note 10, at 1705-08. 
325 See id. at 1705. 
326 Id. at 1706. 
327 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 29-46. 
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and, sadly, every player and coach, as well-MLB could never operate 
a baseball-oriented fund independently of Castro.328 This alone virtu-
ally dooms the project's chances, given the influence of hard-line anti-
Castro groups in America.329 
The idea of a Cuban contract tax, nevertheless, holds some 
promise.330 As Greller notes, by allowing Castro to divert money ear-
marked for baseball toward more important things, like food and 
medicine, the tax could be a boon for both Cuban baseball and 
Cuba's people.331 In a post-Castro, post-embargo Cuba, such a tax 
might help baseball teams expedite the creation of necessary infra-
structure to begin scouting and training more players.332 But so long 
as the Castro regime retains control, the imposition of a Cuban con-
tract tax is an extremely unlikely scenario.333 
2. Changing U.S. Foreign Policy to Accommodate Cuban Players 
Step four-changing U.S. foreign policy by eliminating defection 
as a prerequisite for Cubans to compete in MLB-is, as Greller ac-
knowledges, integral to his plan's success.334 As long as Castro remains 
in power, the United States is unlikely to lift the embargo in its en-
tirety.335 Thus, with regard to U.S. policy, ending Cuban defection re-
quires the passage of either of two bills currently under consideration 
328 See id. 
329 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
330 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1707-08. 
331 See id. 
332 Cf Cherington Interview, supra note 306 (commenting that it would take some time 
for clubs to get their Cuba operations up and running once the country opened to MLB). 
333 See supra notes 327-329 and accompanying text. 
334 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1708-09 ("These changes by MLB and Cuba [steps one 
through three] will not succeed unless efforts begin at home. The United States must 
change its immigration policies to ... illustrate that [it] no longer will force Cuban base-
ball players to defect in order to compete in MLB."). 
335 See RATLIFF & FONTAINE, supra note 71, at 3-4. The authors make an impassioned 
and well-reasoned argument to lift the embargo: 
fd. 
Too often today the main issues raised, particularly by the most militant poli-
ticians and political activists who support sanctions, seem to be driven by an 
understandable but misguided and counterproductive vendetta against Fidel 
Castro that smacks of hysteria and cold war politics .... [T] hose who urge the 
lifting of sanctions are often said to be "soft" on Castro .... Too many em-
bargo supporters seem to have studied strategy and tactics with Don Quixote; 
they simply brandish slightly updated versions of old leftist/rightist cliches to 
tilt with windmills guarded by straw men. The tragic commentary on U.S. pol-
icy toward Cuba is that Don Quixote invariably wins. 
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in the House of Representatives. The Baseball Diplomacy Act (BDA) , 
last introduced by Representative Jose Serrano (D-N.Y) in January 
2003, would allow Cubans to come to America to play professional 
baseball and return to Cuba with their earnings.336 Another of Rep. 
Serrano's proposals, the Bridges to the Cuban People Act (BCPA), a 
wide-ranging embargo relaxation bill introduced 2003, incorporates 
language similar to the BDA.337 As of fall 2004, the BCPA had fifty-
nine co-sponsors in the House and had been referred to the House 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims.338 
If enacted, the BCPA or the BDA would exempt all Cuban na-
tionals who come to the United States to play professionally from cer-
tain restrictions related to the embargo and relevan t immigration 
law.339 Both bills would allow players to obtain visas for the duration of 
each season they are under contract, and to return to Cuba with their 
earnings.34o 
The chances of either bill's passage are relatively poor, despite 
recent indications of support for reforming the embargo.341 The BDA 
and the relevant part of the BCPA, section 408, are specifically criti-
cized for permitting professional athletes to return to Cuba with their 
earnings, while doing nothing to prevent the Castro regime's seizure 
of those earnings.342 The mere possibility that Castro might seize mil-
lions of dollars from returning ballplayers is unpalatable to anti-
336 H.R. 189, 108th Congo (2003); see Greller, supra note 10, at 1708-10. 
337 Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2003, H.R. 3422, 108th Congo (2003). 
338 See H.R. 3422, Bill Summary & Status, 108th Congo (2003), at http://thomas. 
loc.goy/ cgi-bin/bdquery /D?d 108: 15:./temp/ -bdOzuy:: (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
339 See H.R. 3422 § 408; H.R. 189. 
340 SeeH.R. 3422 § 408; H.R. 189. 
341 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 132 (discussing opposition to and failure of Baseball Di-
plomacy Act in 1996 and 1998); Susan Kepecs, Cuba Embargo on Its Last Legs?, CAPITAL 
TIMES (Madison, Wis.),Jan. 4, 2003, at 1B (quoting former House speaker Dick Armey: "If 
[the trade and travel restrictions] last a year, it will be the last year they last."). In the fall of 
2003, an amendment to a transportation appropriations bill, which would have lifted the 
ban on Americans traveling to Cuba, gained the support of a wide bipartisan m~ority in 
both houses of Congress. Young, supra note 309. President Bush's threat to veto any bill 
that tinkered with the embargo, however, led the House Republican leadership to ditch 
the amendment in conference. Id. A similar showdown between the Bush Administration 
and Congress ensued in the fall of 2004, as the House voted to deny funding changes that 
would have tightened travel restrictions to Cuba, despite threats of a ,\lhite House veto. See 
Bachelet, supra note 309. The restrictions promulgated by the 'Vhite House in the summer 
of 2004, and rejected by the House, would limit visits to Cuba by inunediate family mem-
bers to once every three years-the current rule is once per year-and ban travel by more 
distant relatives such as aun ts and cousins. See id. 
342 See H.R. 3422 § 408; H.R. 189. 
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Castro politicians.343 Perhaps if the BDA or section 408 of the BCPA 
included guarantees that no player's salary would find its way into 
Castro's hands-how to guarantee such a thing is a difficult ques-
tion-then Congress might be apt to adopt the proposed legisla-
tion.344 But unless these changes are made, or the political tenor in 
Washington changes drastically, neither the BCPA nor the BDA will 
garner enough support to solve the crisis of Cuban baseball defection. 
3. "Fidel, Inc."345-Would Castro Let Ballplayers Come to America? 
The existence of the defection system is primarily attributable to 
the policies of Fidel Castro.346 Even if the United States unilaterally 
altered its policies to allow Cubans to contract with MLB clubs and 
travel freely back to Cuba, Castro's long-standing practices make the 
demise of defection unlikely.347 
Cuban ballplayers are essential to Castro's propaganda.348 The 
regime trumpets the successes of the amateur system and the national 
team, declaring them victories for the revolution and the Cuban peo-
ple.349 As Cuba's economy falters, success in baseball is one of few ac-
complishments to which the government can cling.350 The high level 
of amateur competition in Cuba, goes the government's myth, shows 
that baseball can succeed while it retains its socialist character.351 Ac-
cording to this myth, money is irrelevant-players compete for love of 
the game and, of course, their country.352 
Castro's need to maintain this myth further indicates that he will 
probably never permit Cubans to play in America.353 Cubans playing 
in MLB would be "symbol[s] of the freedom, the wealth and the pos-
343 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 132. 
344 See Greller, supra note 10, at 1710 ("Admittedly, preventing the Castro government 
from seizing the salaries of [returning) players may prove difficult."); ifJAMAIL, supra note 
8, at 132 (noting that opposition to the Baseball Diplomacy Act stemmed from fears that 
the Cuban government would confiscate player's paychecks). 
345 FAINARU & SANCHEZ, sttpra note 13, at 127. 
346 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
347 See JAMAIL, supra note 8, at 129-30 (quoting Gilberto Dihigo: "Until Fidel dies, I 
don't see any way that would allow Cuban players to become professional."). 
348 See ECHEVARRiA, sttpra note 27, at 362 (noting the revolution's effect on Cuban 
baseball and the "relentless propaganda about its benefits in the Cuban press"); JAMAIL, 
supra note 8, at 133-34. 
349 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 133-34, 141. 
350 See id. at 133-34. 
351 Sce id. at 133. 
352 See id. 
353 Sce id. at 133-34. 
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sibility for open-ended self-fulfillment that America has long repre-
sen ted to people under [Castro's] totalitarian control. "354 Wealthy 
players returning from America would intolerably challenge Castro's 
communist system and anti-American worldview.355 
Most importantly, Castro's anti-Americanism extends to the base-
ball field. 356 Since the heady, early days of the revolution, Castro has 
believed in waging a battle between Cuban baseball and American 
baseball-between "la pelota libre" and "la pelota esclava. '357 "The Cu-
ban people have invested [in their baseball players]," the Cuban 
baseball commissioner explains, "[a]nd no one has the right to take 
them away. "358 Considering the doggedness with which Castro has 
pursued the victory of "fa pelota libre," it is almost inconceivable that 
the dictator would grant permission for Cuban baseball players to play 
"la pelota esclava" in America.359 Castro's longevity and unwavering de-
votion to his ideology ensure the continuation of Cuban baseball de-
fection until the day he is overthrown or dies.36o 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1991, Cuban baseball players with dreams of playing Major 
League Baseball have been stuck in a system that offers no good 
choices. Longstanding policies of both the Cuban and United States 
governments have created a broken system that disregards the basic 
safety and welfare of Cuban ballplayers and their families. The defec-
tion system not only ignores these important humanitarian concerns, 
but also encourages dangerous and illegal immigration practices. 
The plight of Cuban defectors exemplifies the untenable state of 
United States-Cuba relations. Midway through the first decade of the 
new millennium, Castro continues to rule impoverished, languishing 
Cuba with an iron fist; the embargo, more stringent than ever, re-
mains in full force; and young baseball players from Cuba, wanting 
nothing more than the freedom to compete against the world's best, 
354 See Thomas Boswell, No Afatter H'ho WillS. Castro Suffers a Loss, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 
1999, at Dl. 
355 Cf id. (noting that the 1999 Baltimore Orioles trip to Cuba would expose Cubans 
to wealthy, fearless, free American ballplayers, ineyitably eroding Castro's grip on his coun-
try). 
356 See Jamail, supra note 8, at 134. 
357 See id. 
358 Thompson, supra note 283. 
359 SeeJAMAIL, supra note 8, at 134. 
360 See id. at 129-35. 
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must choose between their dreams and their homes. The sorry state 
of baseball relations between the United States and Cuba is ample 
evidence of not only Castro's failed revolution, but also the failure of 
U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. 
Despite the political demagoguery surrounding U.S.-Cuba rela-
tions, the plight of baseball defectors-who are, soberingly, among 
the most fortunate of all Cuban immigrants-should generate serious 
reconsideration of the United States' Cuba policy. Initially imple-
mented, in large part, to accelerate the downfall of the Castro regime, 
the forty-five year old embargo has undeniably failed to achieve that 
objective. Perhaps it is time for the United States to pursue a different 
policy aimed at ensuring a smooth, nonviolent transition to a more 
democratic and market-oriented post-Castro Cuba.361 
For potential Cuban baseball defectors, any policy changes in the 
United States would be virtually irrelevant so long as Castro remains 
Cuba's leader. The defection system will almost certainly last as long 
as Castro does. But the greatest travesty for Cuban ballplayers, MLB, 
U.S.-Cuba relations, and the Cuban people, would be to maintain dip-
lomatic hostility between the two countries after Castro's demise. 
Today's young Cuban baseball stars-having heard the stories of 
Rene Arocha and El Duque and Jose Contreras-wonder whether 
they, too, will soon confront the wrenching decision to leave behind 
their homes, families, and lives for a future in American baseball. This 
generation of Cuban defectors-from the World Series heroes to the 
rookie league flameouts-has confronted profound adversity with 
dignity. Hopefully, the next generation of Cuban baseball players, and 
their families, will not to have face the extremely difficult choices of 
their predecessors. Americans and Cubans alike must ensure that Cu-
ban baseball defection soon becomes a mere relic in the history of 
baseball. 
361 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE, CUBAN TRANSITION PROJECT, INST. FOR CUBAN & 
CUBAN-AM. STUD. (ICCAS), U. OF MIAMI, THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND ELECTORAL 
POLITICS: ADAPTATION, SUCCESSION, AND TRANSITION (2002), available at http://ctp.ic-
cas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/WLeoGrande.pdf; ERNESTO BETANCOURT, CUBAN TRAN-
SITION PROJECT, INST. FOR CUBAN & CUBAN-AM. STUD. (ICCA~), U. OF MIAMI, INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND POST-CASTRO CUBA (2003), available at http://ctp.iccas.mi-
ami.edu/Research_Studies/EBetancourt.pdf. 
